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Abridging the Freedom of Non-English Speech: 
English-Only Legislation and the Free Speech Rights 
of Government Employees 
A multitude of commentators has spoken against and written 
both articles and books condemning official-English and English-
only1 legislation as unwise,2 unconstitutional,3 racist,4 and divisive.5 
Yet, even though few commentators support the constitutionality of 
English-only statutes,6 such legislation is on the rise, mostly through 
 
 1. Throughout this paper I will use the term “English-only” rather than “official Eng-
lish.” I am aware that many states have official-English statutes that could not fairly be termed 
“English-only” statutes because they do not prohibit the use of languages other than English. 
For example, Indiana’s official-English law merely says, “The English language is adopted as 
the official language of the state of Indiana.” IND. CODE ANN. § 1-2-10-1 (West, WESTLAW 
through 2000 2d Reg. Sess.). In contrast, the Arizona amendment, which is the focus of this 
paper, the Alaska statute, and the Utah statute each declare English to be the sole language of 
the government and prohibit the use of other languages. See infra Appendices A–C. 
 2. See infra note 5. 
 3. See infra note 20. 
 4. See, e.g., Antonio J. Califa, Declaring English the Official Language: Prejudice Spo-
ken Here, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 293, 294 (1989) (“The leaders of the English-Only 
movement focus their public arguments on the goal of national unity. Hidden inside this velvet 
glove is the iron fist of prejudice and discrimination. The English-Only movement is actually 
an expression of the underlying insecurity about and prejudice towards Hispanics.”). 
 5. Articles focusing on divisiveness or lack of wisdom in enacting English-only statutes, 
but not on constitutionality per se, include: Steven W. Bender, Consumer Protection for Lati-
nos: Overcoming Language Fraud and English-Only in the Marketplace, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 
1027 (1996); Drucilla Cornell & William W. Bratton, Deadweight Costs and Intrinsic Wrongs 
of Nativism: Economics, Freedom, and Legal Suppression of Spanish, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 
595 (1999); Joseph E. Magnet, Language Rights as Collective Rights, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
OFFICIAL ENGLISH: THE CAMPAIGN FOR ENGLISH AS THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE OF THE USA 
293 (Karen L. Adams & Daniel T. Brink eds., 1990) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVES ON OFFICIAL 
ENGLISH]; Rachel F. Moran, Language and the Law in the Classroom: Bilingual Education 
and the Official English Initiative, in PERSPECTIVES ON OFFICIAL ENGLISH, supra, at 285–92. 
 6. A rather exhaustive review of sources, Jose Julian Alvarez-Gonzalez, Law, Language 
and Statehood: The Role of English in the Great State of Puerto Rico, 17 LAW & INEQ. 359, 
394 n.167 (1999), lists only two sources arguing that English-only provisions are constitu-
tional: Chris Boehler, Note, Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English: The Struggle to Make 
English the Official Language, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1637 (1998); and Michael W. Valente, 
Comment, One Nation Divisible by Language: An Analysis of Official English Laws in the 
Wake of Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 205 (1997). 
Another source that advocates English-only provisions but does not address the question of 
constitutionality is Barnaby W. Zall & Sharon McCloe Stein, Legal Background and History of 
the English Language Movement, in PERSPECTIVES ON OFFICIAL ENGLISH, supra note 5, at 
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the ballot initiative process. “U.S. English,” the Washington D.C.-
based sponsor of these laws,7 has gone from state to state collecting 
enough signatures to place English-only initiatives on state ballots. 
That scenario repeated itself in Utah in the November 2000 election. 
After the Utah state legislature refused to pass English-only statutes 
in 1997 and 1999,8 “U.S. English” spent “hundreds of thousands of 
dollars” to get the measure on the Utah ballot in 2000.9 The Eng-
lish-only initiative passed by approximately seventy percent.10 Alaska, 
in 1998, similarly passed a very restrictive English-only initiative.11 
In the 1988 election, Arizona passed an English-only initiative 
amendment to the Arizona Constitution, similar in wording and in 
scope to the Utah and Alaska initiatives.12 The Arizona Amendment 
declared that English was the “language of the ballot, the public 
schools and all government functions and actions.”13 The amend-
ment required that unless one of the few enumerated exceptions ap-
plied, “[t]his State and all political subdivisions of this State shall act 
in English and in no other language.”14 This prohibition on non-
English languages applied to “all government officials and employees 
during the performance of government business.”15 
Arizona’s amendment was universally recognized as “by far the 
most restrictively worded official-English law to date.”16 The 
 
261–71. 
 7. See U.S. English, Inc., Welcome to U.S. ENGLISH, Inc., at http://www.us-
english.org/inc/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2001) (“In the last four years, Alaska, Georgia, Mon-
tana, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Wyoming and Missouri have enacted 
some form of official English legislation with the help of U.S. ENGLISH.”). 
 8. The English-Only Movement in Utah, ACLU Utah, at http://www.aclu-
utah.org/EObackground.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2001). 
 9. Dennis Romboy, Group Ready to Defend New English-Only Law: Initiative Passed 
on Nov. 7 Faces a Constitutional Test (Dec. 2, 2000), available at http://deseret-
news.com/dn/view/0,1249,230012735,00.html. 
 10. Bob Bernick, Jr., Matheson Buoys Demos: But Utah GOP in Firm Control at State 
Capitol (Nov. 8, 2000), available at http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/0,1249, 
230007305,00.html. 
 11. See Kritz v. State, No. 3DI-99-12 CI, slip op. at *1 (Alaska Super. Ct. Mar. 3, 
1999) (challenging constitutionality of English-only statute). 
 12. See infra Appendix A for the Arizona amendment; Appendix B for the Utah statute; 
and Appendix C for the Alaska amendment. 
 13. ARIZ. REV. STAT. CONST. art. 28 (2001). See Appendix A for the full text of the 
amendment. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Michele Arington, English-Only Laws and Direct Legislation: The Battle in the 
4ROB.DOC 3/5/02  9:16 PM 
1641] Abridging the Freedom of Non-English Speech 
 1643 
amendment was declared unconstitutional: first by a federal district 
court,17 then by the Ninth Circuit,18 and finally in 1998 by the Ari-
zona Supreme Court.19 All three courts found the amendment un-
constitutional under the First Amendment as an abridgment of free 
speech. 
In contrast, many, and perhaps most, commentators who have 
argued that English-only statutes are unconstitutional have relied 
primarily on the Equal Protection Clause.20 Some have criticized the 
Ninth Circuit and Arizona courts for resting their English-only 
 
States over Language Minority Rights, 7 J.L. & POL. 325, 337 (1991). 
 17. Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309 (D. Ariz. 1990) [hereinafter Mofford], aff’d 
sub nom. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc) 
[hereinafter Yniguez], and rev’d on procedural grounds by Arizonans for Official English v. 
Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997). The Ninth Circuit’s ruling was overturned by the United States 
Supreme Court for mootness. The Court also stated that the Ninth Circuit and the federal dis-
trict court should have certified the question of the appropriate construction of the amend-
ment to the Arizona Supreme Court or, alternatively, should have abstained from ruling on the 
constitutional issue until after the Arizona Supreme Court had construed the amendment in 
analogous proceedings pending in state court. Id. at 75–80. The Supreme Court did not reach 
or comment on the constitutionality of the English-only amendment. 
 18. Yniguez, 69 F.3d 920. 
 19. Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc). 
 20. See Alvarez-Gonzalez, supra note 6, at 394 n.167 (listing five books and nearly 
thirty law review articles concluding that English-only statutes are unconstitutional). 
Sources not identified by Alvarez-Gonzalez that similarly conclude that English-only 
statutes are unconstitutional include Paul Bender, The Arizona Supreme Court: Its 1997–98 
Decisions, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 875, 889–96 (1998) (suggesting that the federal Equal Protection 
Clause is a “possible basis” for finding English-only statutes unconstitutional); Califa, supra 
note 4 (arguing that English-only statues are unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause); 
Yuval Merin, The Case Against Official Monolingualism: The Idiosyncrasies of Minority Lan-
guage Rights in Israel and the United States, 6 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (1999) (arguing 
that English-only statutes violate the Equal Protection Clause because language rights are a 
fundamental right); John Trasvina, Bilingualism and the Constitution, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
OFFICIAL ENGLISH, supra note 5, at 281–84 (finding that there is no fundamental right to 
foreign language use, but that by restricting language, other fundamental rights may be uncon-
stitutionally burdened under the Equal Protection Clause); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Judicial 
Review of Initiatives and Referendums in Which Majorities Vote on Minorities’ Democratic 
Citizenship, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 399 (1999) (advocating a new Equal Protection Clause test and 
finding English-only provisions to be unconstitutional); Scott H. Angstreich, Recent Case, 
Speaking in Tongues: Whose Rights at Stake?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 634 (1996) 
(arguing that English-only statutes unconstitutionally infringe on rights of the recipients); and 
Donna F. Coltharp, Comment, Speaking the Language of Exclusion: How Equal Protection 
and Fundamental Rights Analyses Permit Language Discrimination, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 149, 
212 (1996) (concluding that English-only statutes should be found unconstitutional under  
the Equal Protection Clause “by declaring language-based discrimination to be suspect”). See 
generally LANGUAGE LOYALTIES: A SOURCE BOOK ON THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH 
CONTROVERSY (James Crawford ed., 1992). 
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analysis on the First Amendment, stating that the courts should have 
invoked the Equal Protection Clause, rather than “dressing an equal 
protection analysis in First Amendment clothes.”21 In spite of these 
criticisms, there are some good reasons for the courts to have 
avoided the Equal Protection Clause. 
First, under the Equal Protection Clause, a statute will likely be 
upheld as constitutional unless strict or intermediate scrutiny applies, 
neither of which is likely in the English-only context.22 Second, 
courts may be wary of creating an affirmative fundamental right to 
government services in a foreign language under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.23 First Amendment doctrine allows a court to strike 
 
 21. Cecilia Wong, Note, Language Is Speech: The Illegitimacy of Official English After 
Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 306 (1996); see also 
Bender, supra note 20, at 895–96 (noting that the First Amendment concerns do “not seem to 
be at the heart of what is wrong with the Amendment. The Amendment’s devastating and un-
equal effect on the ability of non-English-speaking people to receive government benefits and 
services would, for example, appear to constitute a much more significant practical conse-
quence.”); Karla C. Robertson, Note, Out of Many, One: Fundamental Rights, Diversity, and 
Arizona’s English-Only Law, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 311, 329, 333 (1996) (“The court should 
have properly recognized language as a proxy for national origin and acknowledged the 
amendment’s disparate impact on Latinos and other national origin groups by invalidating the 
amendment on equal protection grounds.”); Martina Stewart, Recent Development, English-
Only Laws, Informational Interests, and the Meaning of the First Amendment in a Pluralistic 
Society, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 539, 557 (1996) (approving of the use of the First 
Amendment, but then noting that the statute “raise[d] very serious equal protection concerns” 
and yet “neither the Ninth Circuit nor the district court mentioned the equal protection impli-
cations”). 
For another article claiming the illegitimacy of a First Amendment analysis for English-
only statutes, but not specifically analyzing Yniguez, see Magnet, supra note 5, at 294 (stating 
that the First Amendment “is insecure as a foundation for language rights because language 
rights are not individual rights. . . . Language rights are collective rights.”). 
 22. The Supreme Court has applied intermediate scrutiny in only a limited class of cases, 
such as restrictions based on gender and illegitimacy. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 
(1988). Strict scrutiny applies only if the provision in question disadvantages a “suspect class” 
or burdens a “fundamental right.” See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–17 & nn.14–15 
(1982). While race is a suspect class and there is a relationship between race and non-English 
speakers, the Supreme Court has not ruled that the two are synonymous. See Hernandez v. 
New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371 (1991) (plurality opinion) (“It may well be, for certain ethnic 
groups and in some communities, that proficiency in a particular language, like skin color, 
should be treated as a surrogate for race under an equal protection analysis.”). But see 
Aghazadeh v. Me. Med. Ctr., No. 98-421-P-C, 1999 WL 33117182 at *4 (D. Me. June 8, 
1999) (listing contrary authority). Moreover, the Supreme Court is not likely to add a new 
suspect classification, particularly in the language context in which there may be legitimate rea-
sons to have language restrictions in some circumstances. 
 23. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33–34 (1973); 
Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 936–37. Even some of the commentators who argue that language choice 
is a fundamental right attempt to avoid creating an affirmative right to government services in a 
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down an English-only provision as an impermissible restriction on 
speech without holding that language minorities have an enforce-
able, fundamental right to services in a foreign language.24 Finally, 
unless a statute facially discriminates against a suspect class, it is likely 
valid under the Equal Protection Clause unless the plaintiffs can 
prove that those who enacted the statute acted with an improper 
motive or intent to discriminate.25 By contrast, First Amendment 
analysis does not turn on motives. 
Consequently, the First Amendment has been the judicial doc-
trine of choice in striking down English-only statutes. Specifically, 
courts have found that restrictive English-only statutes abridge (1) 
the free speech rights of government employees; (2) the free speech 
rights of legislators and elected government officials; (3) the free 
speech rights of the recipients; and (4) the First Amendment rights 
of non-English-speaking citizens to petition their government for 
 
foreign language by stating that language choice, unlike other fundamental rights, is only avail-
able in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Merin, supra note 20, at 46 (stating that “[u]nlike 
other fundamental rights . . . the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of language is 
not an absolute. There is no obligation for a state to conduct all of its activities in any language 
spoken by the inhabitants in its territory.”). Another commentator attempted to avoid this 
problem by devising a new Equal Protection Clause test to scrutinize statutes, like English-only 
statutes, where a majority voted on the civic participation of minorities. This test includes look-
ing at whether “civic participation rights [of a minority have] been severely impinged.” Vargas, 
supra note 20, at 519. 
 24. Of course, First Amendment rights are themselves fundamental rights. Thus, if a 
statute burdens a First Amendment right, a court will apply strict scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause to determine the statute’s constitutionality. But invoking the Equal Protec-
tion Clause in this manner still requires a court to evaluate the statute’s impact on First 
Amendment rights. See Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 93 (1972). A court 
wary of a First Amendment analysis gains little in invoking the Equal Protection Clause where 
the equal protection violation is dependent on the existence of First Amendment rights. The 
Arizona Supreme Court found that the Arizona amendment was also unconstitutional under 
the Equal Protection Clause because it burdened the fundamental right of citizens to petition 
the government for redress of grievances. See Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984, 1000–02 (Ariz. 
1998) (en banc). 
 25. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976); Vill. of Arlington Heights 
v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977). While at least one commentator 
believes a court could find that voters acted with an improper purpose in passing an English-
only provision by ballot initiative, see Robertson, supra note 21, at 331, Paul Bender noted 
that “a state supreme court might understandably be reluctant to make” a finding “that the 
Amendment was motivated by a purpose to disadvantage Hispanics or American Indians, 
rather than by a desire to enhance English usage,” especially “about a measure enacted (how-
ever narrowly) through a statewide voter initiative.” Bender, supra note 20, at 893; see also 
Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of Los Angeles, 458 U.S. 527, 543–44 (1982) (holding that in a 
case where voters passed an amendment limiting busing for desegregation, the “claim of dis-
criminatory intent on the part of millions of voters” was “‘pure speculation’”). 
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redress of grievances.26 As apparent from these categories, one of the 
problematic aspects of a constitutional evaluation is that such legisla-
tion tends expressly to limit only the language used by the govern-
ment. Government officials and employees are the only ones actually 
denied the ability to speak in a foreign language. The constitutional-
ity of restricting foreign language use by elected government offi-
cials, such as legislators, has been examined in two law review arti-
cles,27 as well as in Judge Brunetti’s concurrence in the Ninth Circuit 
opinion.28 Each of these analyses concludes that English-only restric-
tions, as applied to elected government officials, are unconstitutional 
under the First Amendment. By contrast, the free speech rights of 
hired government employees in the English-only context have been 
examined seriously only in the Ninth Circuit’s decision, Yniguez v. 
Arizonans for Official English.29 As will be shown, both the Ninth 
Circuit majority and dissents had considerable difficulty in their 
analyses and made rather serious errors. 
In spite of the apparent difficulty of the analysis, it is important 
to examine the rights of government employees in the English-only 
context. As stated by the Ninth Circuit, the largest impact of Eng-
lish-only legislation is on a state’s “numerous state and local public 
employees. In sheer number, these employees represent the most 
substantial target of [an English only statute’s] restrictions on speech 
in languages other than English as they constitute the most common 
source of communications between the government and the public 
that it serves.”30 
In this Comment, I will argue that broad English-only statutes, 
such as the Arizona amendment, abridge the free speech rights of 
government employees and are, therefore, unconstitutional. Whether 
or not an English-only statute is constitutional is determined in large 
part by which First Amendment analyses and doctrines are deemed 
applicable. I will argue in Part I that in the English-only context, the 
 
 26. See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 947; Kritz v. State, No. 3DI-99-12 CI, slip op. at *6 
(Alaska Super. Ct. Mar. 3, 1999); Ruiz, 957 P.2d at 1000, 1002. 
 27. Michael Albert Thomas Pagni, Note, The Constitutionality of English-Only Provi-
sions in the Public Employee Speech Arena: An Examination of Yniguez v. Arizonans for Offi-
cial English, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 247, 274–75 (1996); Robertson, supra note 21, at 
326. 
 28. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 950–51 (Brunetti, J., concurring). 
 29. Id. at 920. 
 30. Id. at 933. 
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free speech rights of employees should be examined under the test 
articulated in Pickering v. Board of Education and its progeny and 
that other First Amendment analyses are largely irrelevant. Part II 
will briefly overview the legislation concerning the Arizona statute, 
giving background for the analysis in Part III, where I will apply a 
Pickering and progeny analysis to an English-only provision, using 
the interpretation given to the Arizona statute. Part IV will discuss 
my conclusion that English-only statutes abridge the free speech 
rights of government employees. 
I. PICKERING, RUST, AND TRADITIONAL FREE SPEECH DOCTRINES: 
WHAT MODE OF FIRST AMENDMENT  
ANALYSIS APPLIES? 
A. Competing Analyses: An Introduction to Pickering and Rust 
The general test for determining whether the speech rights of a 
public employee have been violated is found in Pickering v. Board of 
Education31 and its progeny, specifically Connick v. Myers32 and 
United States v. National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU).33 In 
Pickering, an Illinois school board fired a teacher for sending a letter 
to a local newspaper.34 The letter was critical of the school board’s 
attempts to raise money through bond proposals and its allocation of 
previously raised funds. In Pickering, the Court established that 
[t]he problem in any [government employee] case is to arrive at a 
balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in 
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the 
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public ser-
vices it performs through its employees.35 
The school board in Pickering argued that the letter interfered with 
the efficient operation of the school system.36 The Court found that 
such concerns were not substantial and that nothing indicated that 
 
 31. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 32. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 33. 513 U.S. 454 (1995) [hereinafter NTEU]. The NTEU analysis is applicable when-
ever the state issues a broad ex ante prohibition on government employee speech, rather than a 
single adverse post hoc employment decision for one employee’s speech. 
 34. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564. 
 35. Id. at 568. 
 36. Id. at 564. 
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the speech had impeded Pickering’s performance as a teacher.37 
Thus, the Court found that Pickering had spoken on a matter of 
public concern and that his interests outweighed the employment in-
terests of the school board.38 His speech was protected, and the 
school board could not constitutionally dismiss him. 
In Connick, the Court announced a second prong of the 
Pickering doctrine: the balancing test applied in Pickering (and, thus, 
protection of speech) would not apply “when a public employee 
speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as 
an employee upon matters only of personal interest.”39 In Connick, a 
District Attorney had decided to transfer Myers to a different section 
of the criminal court. Infuriated by the transfer, Myers wrote a ques-
tionnaire to distribute to her coworkers, inquiring about the transfer 
policy, general morale in the office, and pressure to work in political 
campaigns.40 She distributed the questionnaire at work and was sub-
sequently fired.41 The Court held that Meyer had spoken “as an em-
ployee” and mostly “on matters only of personal interest.”42 But the 
Court also found that the questionnaire contained one question, 
concerning pressure to work in political campaigns, that constituted 
speech on a matter of public concern.43 Thus, the Court performed a 
complete balancing test, balancing Myers’s interest in speaking on 
that one question of public concern with the interest of her employer 
in efficient and effective employment.44 The Court found that 
Myers’s speech had impeded her own and her coworkers’ ability to 
perform their duties at work, had hurt working relationships in the 
office, and had undermined the authority of the District Attorney.45 
Thus, the interests of the employer in efficient and effective em-
ployment outweighed Myers’s interest in speaking on a question of 
public concern, and, consequently, Myers’s speech was unprotected. 
Plainly, the prohibition against use of foreign languages by gov-
ernment employees does not fit nicely into either the Pickering or 
 
 37. Id. at 572–73. 
 38. Id. at 569–75. 
 39. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147. 
 40. Id. at 140–41. 
 41. Id. at 141. 
 42. Id. at 148–49. 
 43. Id. at 149. 
 44. Id. at 149–54. 
 45. Connick, 461 U.S. at 152–54. 
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Connick categories—it is not really a prohibition of speech either by 
“a citizen upon matters of public concern” or “an employee on mat-
ters only of personal interest.” Both the Ninth Circuit majority and 
dissents in Yniguez had considerable difficulty in conducting an 
analysis in this area.46 Yet the basic rule from Pickering and Connick 
is clear: a court is to balance the employee’s interest to speak on mat-
ters of public concern with the state’s interest in efficient employ-
ment. Such a test is workable in the English-only context. 
The Court’s decision in NTEU further sustains the feasibility and 
appropriateness of employing a Pickering-type balancing test to 
evaluate English-only restrictions on public employees. In NTEU, a 
class of federal employees below the GS-16 level challenged the con-
stitutionality of an “honoraria ban” that prohibited all federal em-
ployees from receiving compensation for writing articles or making 
speeches outside their employment.47 The honoraria ban in NTEU 
was different from all previous Pickering cases. Each Pickering case 
prior to NTEU had addressed a single employer’s post hoc reaction 
to speech and the observed impact of that speech on the employer’s 
interests. NTEU, in contrast, dealt with an ex ante general prohibi-
tion on a certain category of speech, where the precise content of the 
deterred speech was unknown and, because the speech had not yet 
been made, the adverse impact of the prohibited speech on efficient 
and effective employment had not been observed. The Court there-
fore reworked the Pickering test for application to an “ex ante prohi-
bition”48 on speech, a category into which English-only statutes 
would fall. Under the NTEU transformation of the Pickering test, 
the “Government must show that the interests of both potential au-
diences and a vast group of present and future employees in a broad 
range of present and future expression are outweighed by that ex-
pression’s ‘necessary impact on the actual operation of the Govern-
ment.’”49 Furthermore, the government must provide credible proof 
that the prohibition alleviates the alleged harm.50 In NTEU, the 
government argued that the honoraria ban was meant to ensure that 
federal employees not misuse or appear to misuse power by accept-
 
 46. See infra Part III.A. 
 47. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 457. 
 48. Id. at 481 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 49. Id. at 468 (emphasis added) (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571). 
 50. See id. at 472, 475. 
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ing compensation from parties seeking political favors.51 But the 
government brought forth “no evidence of misconduct related to 
honoraria” by “federal employees below grade GS-16.”52 The Court 
thus found that the interests of the employees and audiences out-
weighed those of the government and so the honoraria ban was un-
constitutional as it applied to employees below grade GS-16.53 
The alternative analysis to Pickering and NTEU, particularly in 
the English-only context, is found in the Rust v. Sullivan54 and 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia55 line of 
cases. Both Rust and Rosenberger dealt with the government’s abil-
ity to regulate the content of government-subsidized speech by pri-
vate parties. Rust concerned the constitutionality of certain regula-
tions of the Department of Health and Human Services. The 
regulations restricted parties who accepted federal subsidies for Title 
X programs from “provid[ing] counseling concerning the use of 
abortion as a method of family planning” and from being engaged in 
other abortion-related activities.56 The Court consequently found 
that the government could regulate and dictate the content of the 
governmental message paid for by the government as part of a gov-
ernmental program.57 Consequently, it could prohibit subsidy recipi-
ents from using Title X subsidies to promote abortions.58 
In Rosenberger,59 a student organization, Wide Awake Produc-
tions (WAP), sued the University of Virginia. Under university 
guidelines, WAP qualified for a subsidy for its publication, Wide 
Awake. In accordance with a university regulation, the university de-
nied WAP’s request because of Wide Awake’s Christian point of 
view.60 The Court held that under Rust, “the government [can] 
 
 51. See id. at 472. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See id. at 477–78. 
 54. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 55. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 56. Rust, 500 U.S. at 180–81. The recipients were prohibited from “engaging in activi-
ties that ‘encourag[ed], promot[ed] or advocat[ed] abortion as a method of family planning’” 
and were required to have their governmental projects “‘physically and financially separate’ 
from prohibited abortion activities.” Id. 
 57. See id. at 193–95. 
 58. See id. 
 59. 515 U.S. 819. 
 60. See id. at 826. WAP had acquired university status as a “Contracted Independent 
Organization” (CIO) and so could submit a request for reimbursement for its publication 
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regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when it is the 
speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its own mes-
sages” through government subsidies.61 But, on the other hand, the 
government cannot regulate private messages through government 
subsidies.62 Consequently, the government could not dictate the 
content or viewpoint of a student-opinion publication, and the 
regulation was unconstitutional.63 
In their dissents in Yniguez, Judges Fernandez and Kozinski 
cited Rust and Rosenberger to support the constitutionality of the 
Arizona English-only amendment. They argued that “the State has 
the right to control the content of what it is paying for; it can con-
trol what is said by those who are acting on its behalf.”64 Thus, if 
language is indeed content based, as seems to have been argued by 
the Yniguez plaintiffs,65 the statute is constitutional because an Eng-
lish-only statute concerns the delivery of a government message by a 
government-paid employee and, under Rust, the government can 
regulate the “content” (here meaning the language) of its own mes-
sages. 
Pickering, with its interest-balancing test, and Rust, with its 
bright-line rule that government can dictate its own messages, repre-
sent the competing analyses for evaluating the free speech rights of 
government employees under an English-only restriction. The de-
termination of which test should apply is critical. If Pickering and 
NTEU articulate the applicable test, then a court will weigh the re-
spective interests and might find that an English-only statute is an 
unconstitutional abridgment of public employee speech. But if Rust 
applies, then the English-only statute is constitutional, and the 
speech interests of employees and non-English-speaking recipients 
are not considered—in fact, they are deemed nonexistent. 
 
costs. The regulation stated that certain CIO activities would not be reimbursed, particularly 
religious activities, defined as “any activity that ‘primarily promotes or manifests a particular 
belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.’” Id. at 825. The university had not character-
ized WAP as a “religious organization.” Had it done so, WAP would not have been deemed a 
CIO and would not have been able to seek reimbursement. See id. at 826. 
 61. Id. at 833–35 (emphasis added). 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id. at 824–25. 
 64. Yniguez, 69 F.3d 920, 957 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Fernandez, J., dissenting); 
see also id. at 962–63 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 65. See id. at 956 (Fernandez, J., dissenting). 
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B. The Appropriate Test: Pickering and Progeny 
The Supreme Court has established a single test for analyzing the 
constitutionality of restrictions on the speech of government em-
ployees: the balancing test from Pickering and its progeny.66 As 
stated in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in NTEU, “[t]he time-
tested Pickering balance, most recently applied in Waters, provides 
the governing framework for analysis of all manner of restrictions on 
speech by the government as employer.”67 Even for statutory restric-
tions, such as an English-only statute or the honoraria ban in NTEU, 
the Court has “established that the Government must be able to sat-
isfy a balancing test of the Pickering form to maintain a statutory re-
striction on employee speech.”68 Additionally, the Supreme Court 
has not suggested an alternative analysis to Pickering for analyzing a 
restriction on public employee speech. 
In spite of these statements, it is arguable that Pickering should 
not apply to English-only restrictions on government employees. In 
all the Pickering cases, even where the employee makes the prohib-
ited speech while he is on the job, the speaker is not delivering a 
message from the government, but is giving his own ideas on a mat-
ter of public concern.69 By contrast, in the English-only context, the 
 
 66. Both the Supreme Court and the circuit courts have repeatedly, either explicitly or 
implicitly, stated that for “all” restrictions on the speech of government employees, “there is 
no dispute” that the appropriate analysis is the basic Pickering and progeny test. NTEU, 513 
U.S. at 481 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 668 (1994) (stat-
ing that “[t]here is no dispute in this case about when speech by a government employee is 
protected by the First Amendment,” and then summarizing the Pickering test) (emphasis 
added). See also NTEU, 513 U.S. at 465–66 (stating that “[w]hen a court is required to de-
termine the validity” of “restraints on the job-related speech of public employees,” the court 
“must” apply the Pickering balancing test); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 
274, 284 (1977) (stating that the “question of whether speech of a government employee is 
constitutionally protected expression necessarily entails striking” the Pickering balance) (em-
phasis added); Tucker v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., 97 F.3d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 1996) (conclud-
ing, after examining various First Amendment analyses, that, “[c]asting these red herrings 
aside, we look instead to applicable doctrine, which is found in the case law governing em-
ployee speech in the workplace,” and then performing a Pickering and NTEU analysis); 
Weaver v. United States Info. Agency, 87 F.3d 1429, 1439 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding 
Pickering to be the applicable test in a public employment context when confronted with al-
ternative analyses); Sanjour v. EPA, 56 F.3d 85, 90, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Milwaukee Police 
Ass’n v. Jones, 192 F.3d 742, 749–50 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 67. NTEU, 513 U.S. 454, 480 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 68. Id. at 467 (citing United States Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers 
AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973)). 
 69. See, e.g., NTEU, 513 U.S. at 457 (prohibited honoraria speech was unrelated to 
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employee is delivering a governmental message. On its face, this 
seems to be more akin to the Rust cases, where the subsidized pri-
vate speaker is being paid to deliver a governmental message—
especially in light of the Rosenberger dictum that the government 
can dictate “what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or 
when it enlists private entities to convey its own message.”70 In fact, 
the Fourth Circuit has construed the Pickering test to apply only 
when an employee is speaking “as a citizen” and not when speaking 
in his official capacity “as an employee.”71 As Judge Fernandez char-
 
government work); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 381 (1987) (speech made on the job 
concerned employee’s own feelings about the attempted assassination of President Reagan); 
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141 (1983) (speech made on the job to coworkers con-
cerned employee’s personal complaints); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968) 
(speech concerned teacher’s own opinion about school bond). 
 70. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833. The Ninth Circuit majority attempted to reply to the 
dissenters’ argument by pointing out that Rust and Rosenberger are inapplicable because they 
deal with government-subsidized speech and not with government employee speech. Yniguez, 
69 F.3d at 940 n.24. While a true distinction between the cases, it is a fairly weak rebuttal, for 
it seems likely that if the government can control the content of its message when it is subsidiz-
ing a governmental message, it likely can control the content of a governmental message when 
paying for its delivery by its own employees. The Rosenberger dictum seems to say exactly 
that. 
 71. See Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 406–08 (2000). The Fourth Circuit held 
that if speech is made “as an employee,” in the employee’s official capacity, then Pickering is 
inapplicable. The court implied that Rust applies instead. Id. at 408 n.6. The Fourth Circuit’s 
argument is not persuasive because the Supreme Court has not held the “as a citizen” language 
to be a threshold requirement for protection under Pickering. Rather, the threshold require-
ment under Pickering and Connick is whether the speech could “be fairly characterized as con-
stituting speech on a matter of public concern.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). 
As explained by Judge Murnaghan’s dissent in Urofsky, the majority’s rule is contrary to Con-
nick itself, where the Court found that Myers spoke “as an employee.” Yet because one part of 
her questionnaire was on a matter of public concern, the Court conducted a complete 
Pickering analysis, balancing the interests of Myers in making the speech with the govern-
ment’s interest in efficient employment. See Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 435–36 (Murnaghan, J., 
dissenting). Judge Wilkinson also points out that Connick requires a court to examine the 
“content, form, and context” of the speech, and the majority’s rule makes one prong of the 
analysis dispositive. Id. at 426–27 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). Urofsky concerned a content-
based Internet restriction for state employees, including college and university professors. 
Thus, Judge Wilkinson was also concerned that “[b]y embracing the . . . view that all work-
related speech by public employees is beyond public concern, the majority sanctions state legis-
lative interference in public universities without limit.” Id. at 429–30; see also Boring v. Bun-
combe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 379 (4th Cir. 1998) (Motz, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that “the majority’s holding is grounded in misreading Connick to make the role in which 
a public employee speaks determinative of whether her speech merits First Amendment protec-
tion,” and such is contrary to previous Supreme Court and circuit rulings and to Connick it-
self). 
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acterized the problem in his Yniguez dissent: “[N]one of the Su-
preme Court [Pickering] decisions . . . involved an employee who 
was hired to speak for the government and who performed that 
function in a manner contrary to her instructions.”72 
But Rust is even more inapposite to the English-only context 
than Pickering. In Rust, the subsidy recipients were not allowed to 
counsel patients about abortion as a method of family planning. 
They were paid to give a governmental message, and they were not 
allowed to change the content. In contrast, the employee restricted 
by an English-only provision (who gives the same governmental 
message he gives to everyone else but chooses to do so in Spanish in 
order to communicate to a non-English-speaking recipient) does not 
materially change the content of the governmental message he was 
hired to give—even if the Spanish words have slightly different nu-
ances.73 He thus does not violate the rule of Rust and Rosenberger. 
He gives the same message he was hired to give to the very people to 
whom he was hired to give the message—that is, to citizens who 
need information and help from their government. Such a situation 
is clearly distinguishable from those in which the Supreme Court has 
found that the government can control the content of, meaning the 
ideas conveyed by, a governmental message.74 
 
Additionally, in the English-only context, an employee is speaking “as an employee” and 
yet is not changing the content of the governmental message and so is not violating the rule of 
Rust. The fact that an employee is speaking “as an employee” does not mean the employee is 
necessarily changing the content of a governmental message, nor does it mean that his speech 
is or is not on a matter of public concern. 
The fact that the employee speaks in the workplace as an employee affects the Pickering 
analysis at two other points: (1) in determining whether the speech is of public concern; and 
(2) in determining whether the speech intrudes on the government’s interest in efficiency. See 
infra Parts III.A.3 & III.B. 
 72. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 956 (Fernandez, J., dissenting). 
 73. When the Court held in Rust that the government can control the content of the 
message given by the medical counselors and that the counselors cannot change that content 
by counseling women to have abortions, it is unlikely that the Court used content to mean 
“nuances” between words. Would the Court have ruled the same in Rust if the counselors 
were giving the exact message that the government wanted them to give, in a considerate and 
orderly fashion, but sometimes different employees in describing procedures used slightly dif-
ferent words that may or may not have had somewhat different nuances, but which made no 
difference in meaning so that the overall content of the message remained the same? Such is 
the “content” difference between using English and Spanish. Nuances of specific words is not 
the “content” being discussed in Rust. See Rust, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 74. See id., 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 
540 (1983); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
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Even though both Rust and Pickering are distinguishable from 
the English-only scenario, Pickering and its progeny should be ap-
plied rather than Rust because (1) the Pickering test adequately takes 
into account the government’s interests that are protected by Rust; 
(2) the Rust test does not take into account the speech interests of 
the recipients or the employees that are protected by Pickering and 
NTEU; (3) application of the Rust test in an English-only context 
would foreclose communication between the bilingual employee and 
the recipient without providing an alternative method for the speech 
as required by Rust; and (4) application of Rust in an English-only 
situation would propagate discrepancies in the governmental mes-
sages given to the public, which is one of the problems Rust was in-
tended to eradicate. 
The Supreme Court has stated that Rust protects the state’s in-
terests in defining the scope of its programs, “allocat[ing] scarce re-
sources,” and disseminating a specific governmental message in such 
a way as “to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted 
by the grantee.”75 The Pickering and NTEU test adequately protects 
the same governmental interests. The speech interests of employees 
are protected only when they outweigh the government’s interests in 
efficient and effective employment. All of the governmental interests 
protected by Rust affect the efficiency and effectiveness of govern-
mental employment and so would be considered under Pickering. 
For example, in his Yniguez dissent, Judge Kozinski suggested a 
list of adverse consequences of striking down an English-only statute 
and thus allowing government employees to change the “content” 
of governmental messages. Perhaps in an effort to rally unexpected 
supporters to upholding English-only statutes, Judge Kozinski in-
voked hypotheticals in which a government employee is supposed to 
give a relatively liberal government message (bilingualism, working 
mothers, teaching evolution in school, criminal rights, and affirma-
tive action) but changes the content and gives an ultra-conservative 
message instead (monolingualism, stay-at-home mothers, teaching 
creation myths, refusing to give Miranda warnings, discouraging mi-
nority applicants at a state university).76 
 
 
 75. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 196–200); see Rust, 500 
U.S. at 194. 
 76. See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 961–62 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
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These illustrations are irrelevant in the English-only context, as 
noted before, because in each hypothetical, the government em-
ployee is seeking to change the content of the government’s message 
to one entirely opposed to the content the government wishes to 
disseminate. In contrast, English-only statutes restrict bilingual gov-
ernment employees from giving to non-English-speaking citizens the 
same governmental message that the employee disseminates to eve-
ryone else. But even if the illustrations were on point, the Pickering 
test would adequately protect the government’s interests. Pickering 
requires a balancing of the government’s interests in efficient and ef-
fective employment with the employee’s interest in free speech.77 In 
all of Judge Kozinski’s hypotheticals, the employees were frustrating 
the government’s interest in efficient and effective employment by 
giving a message contrary to the one they were employed to give and 
contrary to what other employees are giving and other citizens are 
receiving. Thus, if any of Judge Kozinski’s hypotheticals were tested 
under a Pickering balancing test (rather than under Rust), a court 
would rule in favor of the government because the employee’s acts 
seriously inhibit the efficiency and employment interests of the gov-
ernment. Thus, even under Pickering, the government’s interests es-
poused in Rust and its progeny would be protected. 
In contrast, the Rust doctrine would not adequately protect the 
speech interests of recipients or employees in the English-only con-
text. Under Pickering and NTEU, a court must weigh the interests 
of both the recipients and the employees against the interests of the 
government. But Rust has no analogous balancing requirement. In 
Rust itself, the Court did not take into account the interest of poten-
tial audiences in receiving, or the speakers in giving, information 
about abortions for family planning. 
Yet the Court recognized that the restriction in Rust did “not 
deny[] a benefit to anyone” because the “regulations do not force 
the Title X grantee to give up abortion-related speech; they merely 
require that the grantee keep such activities separate and distinct 
from Title X activities.”78 In fact, the Court distinguished Rust from 
cases where such restrictions had been deemed “unconstitutional 
conditions.” In the “unconstitutional conditions” cases, the restric-
tion had “effectively prohibit[ed] the recipient from engaging in the 
 
 77. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
 78. Rust, 500 U.S. at 196. 
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protected conduct.”79 In contrast, the Court found that in Rust the 
speakers and recipients had alternative means of communicating. In 
the English-only context, the government employee is “effectively 
prohibited” from providing governmental services and information 
to non-English recipients, and the recipients are “effectively prohib-
ited” from receiving governmental services and information. Thus, 
by applying Rust to an English-only restriction, both speakers and 
recipients would be foreclosed from speech without an adequate al-
ternative, and Rust indicates that an alternative is necessary. 
Finally, Pickering should be applied in the English-only context 
in order to support the result of the Rust cases, namely, that by pro-
hibiting subsidy recipients from altering the content of the message, 
the government will be able to give the same message to all citizens. 
The rule from Rust thus emphasizes uniformity in the message given. 
However, if Rust were applied to uphold an English-only restriction, 
it would cause bilingual employees to give, rather than prevent them 
from giving, disparate messages to English-speaking and non-
English-speaking recipients. Namely, bilingual employees would give 
the entire message to one citizen and no message to another. Thus, 
the only way to adequately protect all of the interests involved in the 
English-only context—the interests of the bilingual employee, the 
non-English-speaking recipient, and the government—is to apply a 
Pickering analysis. 
C. Traditional Doctrines Under the Pickering/NTEU Test: Speech 
or Conduct, Content Based or Content Neutral 
In applying the Pickering analysis, the Ninth Circuit majority and 
dissents in Yniguez analyzed the English-only restrictions to deter-
mine whether or not the statute restricted speech, mode of expres-
sion, or conduct. The majority determined that the Arizona amend-
ment restricted speech, relying primarily (and erroneously) on Cohen 
v. California.80 Judges Fernandez and Wallace argued in dissent that 
the Arizona amendment merely restricted a mode of expression.81 
Additionally, Judge Fernandez in his dissent argued that the English-
only restriction, if content based as had been argued by the parties,82 
 
 79. Id. at 197. 
 80. See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 934–36. 
 81. See id. at 958 (Fernandez, J., dissenting); id. at 959–60 (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
 82. See id. at 957 (Fernandez, J., dissenting) (noting that the parties argued that the 
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was constitutional because under Rust and Rosenberger the govern-
ment can control the “content” of its message.83 He implied that if, 
on the other hand, the restriction were content neutral, it would be 
constitutional under a traditional First Amendment analysis.84 Thus, 
in his view, either way an English-only statute was categorized—
whether content based or content neutral—it was constitutional. 
What the Ninth Circuit majority and dissent failed to realize is 
that these traditional First Amendment doctrines are not relevant in 
the public employee context in which a Pickering and NTEU analy-
sis is applied. 
1. An introduction to First Amendment doctrines 
a. Speech, mode of expression, or conduct? Under traditional 
First Amendment analysis, whether the restriction is on speech, 
mode of expression, or conduct will determine the level of scrutiny 
applied to a restriction.85 If a regulation is not on speech, but on 
conduct that has both “speech” and “non-speech” aspects, then a 
Court applies a lower level of scrutiny under the standard articulated 
in United States v. O’Brien.86 
The Ninth Circuit majority argued that the restriction prohibited 
“speech,” and the dissent argued that it prohibited “mode of expres-
sion,” akin to conduct. It is worth noting briefly that an English-
only restriction is indeed a restriction on speech. The Ninth Circuit, 
the only court to analyze this issue thoroughly, missed the obvious 
point that the way in which speech differs from conduct is that 
speech is direct communication between people through the me-
dium of written or spoken language.87 In describing the dichotomy 
between conduct and speech, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he 
 
statute was content based). Cf. Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984, 990 (1998) (noting that party 
argued “that the Amendment is a content-based regulation of speech”). In Ruiz, the Arizona 
Supreme Court seemed to agree that the amendment was content based but did not analyze 
the issue. Id. at 999 (“Even if the Amendment were characterized as a content- and viewpoint- 
neutral ban, and we hold such a characterization does not apply. . . .”). 
 83. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 957. 
 84. See id. at 956–57. 
 85. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968). 
 86. Id. 
 87. The majority did make a footnote of the fact “that a monolingual person does not 
have the luxury of making the expressive choice to communicate in one language or another,” 
but focused its analysis on Cohen and on a bilingual person’s expressive choice of language and 
the nuances between languages. See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 935 n.19. 
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government generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive con-
duct than it has in restricting the written or spoken word [that is, 
speech].”88 It seems implausible that any court would find that non-
English languages somehow do not qualify as “the written or spoken 
word” by virtue of not being English. Foreign languages, both writ-
ten and spoken, as with English, are used precisely to communicate 
ideas or information. The Arizona statute directly prohibited both 
written and spoken language and thus was a prohibition on speech 
and speech alone. 
Although conduct may be communicative, it is by definition 
non-speech—no written or spoken word (that is, speech) is involved. 
For example, in Street v. New York89 the Supreme Court reversed 
the conviction of a man who had both burned a flag and made deni-
grating comments about the flag. The Court reversed the conviction 
because it was unclear whether he had been convicted for his words 
or his act. The Court found he could not be convicted for his words, 
without reaching the issue of whether the flag-burning conduct was 
protected expression or not. 
The Supreme Court has provided some protection for expressive 
conduct when there are communicative or speech aspects mingled 
with prohibited non-speech and non-communicative conduct.90 If 
language is to be construed as conduct, one wonders what the “non-
communicative” and “non-speech” and non-expressive aspects of 
that conduct are.91 To go a step further, if language is non-
communicative conduct and the ideas only are “speech” or expres-
sion, then there is no such thing as a “pure speech” case. The entire 
dichotomy of speech and conduct is destroyed. For surely if speaking 
in Spanish to a monolingual Spanish speaker is conduct, speaking in 
English to a monolingual English speaker is conduct as well. The 
reason conduct is conduct rather than speech is that it entails aspects 
that we normally do not consider speech. It is hard to make such an 
argument for language. 
The Ninth Circuit correctly found that choice of language is 
speech rather than conduct, but erroneously based its conclusion al-
most entirely on Cohen v. California.92 The Yniguez majority stated 
 
 88. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (citations omitted). 
 89. 394 U.S. 576 (1969). 
 90. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 381–82. 
 91. Id. at 376, 382. 
 92. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
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that “[t]he Supreme Court recognized the First Amendment status 
of choice of language in somewhat different circumstances when it 
ratified a speaker’s freedom to say ‘fuck the draft’ rather than ‘I 
strongly oppose the draft.’”93 The Ninth Circuit then went on to 
point out that just as California could not “excise . . .  ‘one particu-
larly scurrilous epithet from the public discourse,’” Arizona could 
not excise “entire vocabularies” of foreign languages.94 
The Yniguez majority should not have relied on Cohen as the 
crux of its argument that language was speech. Cohen stands for the 
proposition that use of written and spoken words are “speech” even 
when there are alternative modes of expressing that speech. Cohen 
concerned the freedom of choosing one (arguably more “emotive”) 
word over another to convey the same message—the message in 
Cohen being contempt for the draft. As the Supreme Court in Wa-
ters v. Churchill explained, according to Cohen, the “First Amend-
ment demands a tolerance of ‘verbal tumult, discord, and even offen-
sive utterance.’”95 While that proposition is true for the public at 
large, the government is free to restrict what words government em-
ployees will use to convey a government message, as long as the re-
striction promotes the government’s interest in efficient and effective 
employment.96 As stated in Waters v. Churchill, “[W]e have never 
expressed doubt that a government employer may bar its employees 
from using Mr. Cohen’s offensive utterance to members of the pub-
lic.”97 
Yet Cohen is not on point with English-only restrictions. Bilin-
gual employees under an English-only statute are not seeking to ex-
press their ideas in a more “emotive” way or to use “offensive utter-
ances” in performing their duties. Rather, bilingual employees are 
seeking to communicate a message in a language comprehensible to 
the recipient. Cohen would be on point if the Arizona amendment 
merely provided that Arizonan officials could not use non-English 
 
 93. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 935 (citing Cohen, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)). 
 94. Id. The Ninth Circuit also defended the use of foreign languages as “speech” by 
noting the difference in meanings of words in Spanish and English, and the “expressive effect” 
of choosing to speak Spanish rather than English with bilingual people, signifying “solidarity” 
and “comfortableness.” Id. 
 95. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 672 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Cohen, 
403 U.S. at 24–25). 
 96. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 97. Waters, 511 U.S. at 672. 
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profanities, rather than restricting the entirety of all non-English lan-
guages. Arizona’s English-only amendment prohibited communica-
tion of the entire message—whether or not the words used were pro-
fane or courteous, emotive or dispassionate—as long as the message 
was given in non-English. The Arizona Supreme Court mostly 
avoided these problems by characterizing the restriction as a com-
plete prohibition on “communication” and explained that “First 
Amendment protection is afforded to the communication, its source, 
and its recipient.”98 
In Yniguez, Judge Wallace argued in dissent that language is a 
mode of expression because “the majority can point to no bit of in-
formation about medical malpractice claims which can only be com-
municated in a non-English language—and which [the Arizona 
amendment] would thereby restrict Yniguez from communicating 
and the public from receiving.”99 Thus,  
If Yniguez is able to identify to us in English the messages that the 
Article suppresses, she would thereby communicate those messages 
which she claims only Spanish can convey. . . . It is untenable for 
the majority to hold that the Article restricts pure speech yet fail to 
identify suppressed messages. This difficulty strengthens the unde-
niable conclusion that the Article regulates the mode of speech, not 
pure speech. This conclusion should end the matter, for mere regu-
lation of government employees’ mode of speech does not impli-
cate the First Amendment . . . .”100 
The “bit of information about medical malpractice claims”—the 
“suppressed message” that Yniguez was restricted from communicat-
ing to monolingual Spanish speakers whom she was responsible to 
help—is easy to identify; it is the entire message.101 There is nothing 
about medical malpractice that she can communicate to a segment of 
the citizenry because she is not allowed to speak in Spanish, and the 
monolingual Spanish population cannot understand English. Unlike 
Cohen, English-only statutes do not deal with the mere choice of a 
mode of speech or a particular emotive way of expressing a message; 
rather, it is the difference between communicating or not communi-
 
 98. Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984, 997 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc) (citing Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756–57 (1976). 
 99. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 960 (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
 100. Id. at 959–60 (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
 101. Id. 
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cating. The majority in Yniguez concluded their somewhat flawed 
analysis by attempting to make this point: “To call a prohibition that 
precludes the conveying of information to thousands of Arizonans in 
a language they can comprehend a mere regulation of ‘mode of ex-
pression’ is to miss entirely the basic point of First Amendment 
protections.”102 
b. Content based or content neutral? In its First Amendment 
analysis, the Supreme Court has differentiated between content-
based and content-neutral provisions. Content-based provisions “are 
presumptively invalid” because “[t]he government may not regulate 
use based on hostility—or favoritism—towards the underlying mes-
sage expressed.”103 Content-neutral laws regulate the time, place, or 
manner of expression and are subject to a lower level of scrutiny.104 
According to the Supreme Court, content-based laws are gener-
ally defined as “laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech 
from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed” 
or laws whose “manifest purpose is to regulate speech because of the 
message it conveys.”105 In other words, the government regulation is 
aimed at suppressing a particular message. Content-neutral laws are 
generally those “laws that confer benefits or impose burdens on 
speech without reference to the ideas or views expressed.”106 Under 
this general definition, English-only statutes would be considered 
“content neutral” because the government does not distinguish be-
tween favored and disfavored speech on the basis of the message, in-
asmuch as the employee is able to give that same message in English. 
 
 102. Id. at 936. 
 103. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382, 386 (1992) (citations omitted). 
 104. In GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 400 (1999), the authors 
explain that the Supreme Court has recognized that content-neutral limitations can be uncon-
stitutional infringements of free speech, but that the level of scrutiny applied with content-
neutral restrictions varies from case to case: 
The Court generally tests content-neutral restrictions with an implicit balancing ap-
proach: The greater the interference with the opportunities for free expression, the 
greater the burden on government to justify the restriction. When the challenged re-
striction has a relatively severe effect, the Court invokes strict scrutiny. When the 
challenged restriction has a significant, but not severe, effect, the Court employs in-
termediate scrutiny. And when the restriction has a relatively modest effect, the 
Court applies deferential scrutiny. [However, t]here are exceptions to this pattern. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 105. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643, 645 (1994); see also R.A.V., 
505 U.S. 377. 
 106. Turner, 512 U.S. at 643. 
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As a content-neutral regulation of the time, place, or manner of 
expression, an English-only statute would likely be subject to a me-
dium or low level of scrutiny under conventional First Amendment 
analysis.107 However, time, place, and manner provisions are only 
valid if they (1) are content neutral, (2) are narrowly tailored to serve 
a significant government interest, and (3) “leave open ample alterna-
tive channels of communication.”108 While some have argued that 
English-only statutes are valid time, place, or manner provisions,109 
English-only provisions fail to leave open any alternative and often 
are not narrowly tailored to a government interest.110 Thus, they are 
not valid time, place, or manner provisions. 
 
 107. See supra note 104. 
 108. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983); see Ward v. Rock Against Ra-
cism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); see also RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 702–03 § 20.54 (3d ed. 
1999) (quoting Grace, 461 U.S. at 177). If any of these three prongs is lacking, the restriction 
is not an appropriate time, place, or manner restriction. 
 109. Both of the student law review pieces that argue that English-only statutes are con-
stitutional do so by arguing that they are valid time, place, and manner provisions. See 
Boehler, supra note 6, at 1658–64; Valente, supra note 6, at 223–24. 
 110. Even though English-only statutes are content neutral, they could not pass muster 
under the other two prongs. So far, two of the courts reviewing English-only statutes have 
found that the state actually had no valid interest that could be substantiated by any evidence. 
See Yniguez, 69 F.3d. at 942–47; infra note 239 and accompanying text. Even assuming that a 
state was able to show that it had a significant government interest, English-only statutes are 
not sufficiently narrowly tailored because, as broad ex ante prohibitions on speech, such stat-
utes certainly “burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further” the interest and it 
is quite questionable whether the stated government interest “is served in a direct and effective 
way by the requirement.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 801. But even if it could be shown that a 
significant governmental interest existed and that an English-only statute was sufficiently tai-
lored to that interest, English-only statutes would still not be valid under traditional First 
Amendment analysis because they leave no adequate alternative for communicating with non-
English-speaking citizens. The Arizona Supreme Court noted that the effect of an English-only 
statute “cannot be characterized as merely a time, place, or manner restriction because such 
restrictions, by definition, assume and require the availability of alternative means of communi-
cation.” Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984, 998 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc) (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 
802; Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984)); see 
also R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377. 
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2. First Amendment dichotomies are irrelevant under a Pickering or 
NTEU analysis 
Although the Ninth Circuit struggled with whether an English-
only statute restricted speech or mode of expression, and although 
an English-only statute is arguably content neutral, these determina-
tions are irrelevant in the public-employee setting and do not affect 
the level of scrutiny applied. The analysis under Pickering and 
NTEU is the same whether the restriction is content based or con-
tent neutral and whether it is based on speech or on conduct. For 
example, the honoraria ban in NTEU itself was content neutral. The 
ban prohibited employees from receiving compensation for off-the-
job speeches and articles no matter the content. Additionally, the 
majority and dissent make explicit mention of the prohibition’s con-
tent neutrality.111 And yet the Court performed a Pickering analysis; 
in fact, because it was an ex ante broad restriction on speech, the 
Court heightened the government’s burden from what it had been 
in Pickering in defending this content-neutral restriction.112 
The rule that traditional dichotomies of free speech are irrelevant 
in the government employment context was not new with NTEU in 
1995. As early as 1973, only five years after the Pickering decision, 
the Court in United States Civil Service Commission v. National 
Ass’n of Letter Carriers, restated the Pickering test as applying 
equally to both “conduct” and “speech.”113 This was true even 
though traditional First Amendment doctrine declared that “[t]he 
government generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive con-
duct than it has in restricting the written or spoken word [that is, 
speech].”114 In Waters v. Churchill,115 Justice O’Connor explained 
 
 111. See NTEU, 513 U.S. 454, 467 n.11, 468 (1995) (“Although [the restriction] nei-
ther prohibits any speech nor discriminates among speakers based on the content or viewpoint 
of their messages, its prohibition on compensation unquestionably imposes a significant bur-
den on expressive activity.”); id. at 490 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he honoraria ban is 
neither content nor viewpoint based.”); see also United States Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l 
Ass’n of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973), where the Court applied a 
Pickering test to the provisions of the Hatch Act, even though the restrictions “are not aimed 
at particular parties, groups, or points of view, but apply equally to all partisan activities.” In 
other words, the restrictions were content neutral. 
 112. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 113. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 564. 
 114. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989). 
 115. 511 U.S. 661 (1994) (plurality opinion). 
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why these First Amendment doctrines do not apply in the Pickering 
context. That reason requires an understanding of the government’s 
power to restrict the speech of government employees. As Justice 
O’Connor explained: 
The key to First Amendment analysis of government employment 
decisions, then, is this: The government’s interest in achieving its 
goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated from a rela-
tively subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a significant 
one when it acts as employer. The government cannot restrict the 
speech of the public at large just in the name of efficiency. But 
where the government is employing someone for the very purpose 
of effectively achieving its goals, such restrictions may well be ap-
propriate.116 
Consequently, the government can disregard most of the fun-
damental free speech doctrines when it is acting as employer as long 
as the government’s restrictions on free speech would promote the 
government’s interest in effective and efficient employment. For ex-
ample, if an employee makes a statement that disrupts efficient or ef-
fective employment, then the government can dismiss that em-
ployee—even if the dismissal under traditional First Amendment 
analysis would be content based and thus “presumptively invalid.”117 
As Justice O’Connor explains, the government employer does not 
have to inquire, as he would under a traditional First Amendment 
regime, whether “this dismissal would somehow be narrowly tailored 
to a compelling governmental interest.”118 Rather, the only inquiry 
the government employer has to make is whether “a quieter subor-
dinate would allow [the employer] to do this job more effec-
tively.”119 Thus, “many of the most fundamental maxims of our First 
Amendment jurisprudence cannot reasonably be applied to speech 
by government employees.”120 
In most situations, the fact that First Amendment doctrines are 
irrelevant in the public employment setting will benefit the govern-
ment and not the employee. For the government employer can enact 
restrictions, as long as they promote efficient and effective employ-
 
 116. Id. at 675. 
 117. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (citations omitted). 
 118. Waters, 511 U.S. at 675. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 672. 
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ment, that are content based, regulate speech, are vague, restrict of-
fensive utterances, etc.121 The only limit on the government em-
ployer’s ability to enforce such restrictions is that his employment in-
terests must outweigh the employee’s interest in speaking on matters 
of public concern.122 But the Court made clear in NTEU that the 
rule is a two-edged sword. For just as traditional free speech doc-
trines do not restrict government employers from burdening free 
speech, conversely, traditional free speech doctrines cannot save gov-
ernment restrictions from being found unconstitutional when either 
(1) the restrictions on speech do not promote the government’s le-
gitimate interests in efficient and effective employment, or (2) the 
interests of the employee in speaking on matters of public concern 
outweigh the government’s employment interests. As stated in 
NTEU: “Our Pickering cases only permit the Government to take 
adverse action based on employee speech that has adverse effects on 
‘the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency 
of the public services it performs through its employees.’”123 Though 
it may appear in retrospect that the Pickering cases prior to NTEU 
involved content-based adverse employment decisions,124 the NTEU 
majority explained that in each of these cases the relevant issue was 
not whether the restriction was “viewpoint based,” but was whether 
“the government employer could demonstrate that such expression 
disrupted workplace efficiency.”125 
 
 
 121. Justice O’Connor makes explicit mention of the irrelevance of vagueness and offen-
sive utterances. See id. at 672–73; see also supra notes 111, 113. 
 122. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
 123. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 467 n.11 (emphasis added). 
 124. In each case, the employee expressed an idea and was subsequently fired, presumably 
because the employer disagreed with the content. See, e.g., Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. 
Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 411–12 (1979) (involving employee discharged after expressing concerns 
to her principal); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141 (1983) (addressing dismissal of em-
ployee who had distributed questionnaire to coworkers); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 
563, 564 (1968) (involving teacher dismissed for writing letter to the editor). 
 125. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 467 n.11. The dissent argued that viewpoint and content neu-
trality, even if they do not make the prohibition constitutional, “are important factors” in 
evaluating whether the speech is protected under Pickering. Id. at 500 n.6 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting). The Second Circuit, in Harman v. City of New York, 140 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 
1998), took into account in balancing the competing interests the fact that the restriction was 
“broader than the honoraria ban struck down in NTEU” because the NTEU ban merely 
“placed a burden on employee speech by denying compensation,” but the restrictions in Har-
man “directly regulate[d] speech.” 
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Thus, Judge Fernandez’s implication in Yniguez that an English-
only restriction is constitutional if it is content neutral (and thus sub-
ject to lower level scrutiny) is defeated by the facts of NTEU itself. 
For the ban in NTEU “neither prohibit[ed] any speech nor dis-
criminate[d] among speakers based on the content or viewpoint of 
their messages.”126 More importantly, NTEU declared that public 
employment restrictions on free speech are to be analyzed under the 
same standard, whether they are content based or content neutral127 
and whether they restrict speech or conduct.128 The only differentia-
tion in the standard applied in the Pickering line of cases is that the 
government has a higher burden to justify ex ante prohibitions under 
NTEU than it has for post hoc employment decisions under 
Pickering. In a Pickering and NTEU analysis, the only considerations 
to take into account are (1) the interests of the employee in speaking 
out and the interests of the potential audience in receiving speech on 
a matter of public concern,129 and (2) the interest of the government 
as an employer in efficient and effective employment.130 
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE INTERPRETATION OF AND THE 
ADJUDICATIONS CONCERNING THE ARIZONA  
ENGLISH-ONLY AMENDMENT 
Having determined in Part I that the proper legal framework for 
evaluating the constitutionality of an English-only statute is found 
solely in the Pickering and NTEU analyses, in this section I will 
briefly review the adjudications concerning the Arizona amendment. 
The decisions of the three courts and their interpretation of the 
amendment will provide context for the analysis of English-only 
statutes under the Pickering and NTEU test in Part III. 
 
 126. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 468. 
 127. The circuit courts have applied the same stringent standard set out for the content-
neutral statute in NTEU to content-based statutes. See, e.g., Hoover v. Morales, 164 F.3d 
221, 227 (5th Cir. 1998) (content-based restriction); Sanjour v. EPA, 56 F.3d 85, 96 (D.C. 
Cir. 1995) (same). 
 128. See supra notes 113–120 and accompanying text. Additionally, in none of the Su-
preme Court’s Pickering and NTEU cases has the court evaluated whether the restriction was 
content based or content neutral, on speech or on conduct. The Supreme Court merely men-
tions these doctrines in NTEU and National Ass’n of Letter Carriers but performs no exacting 
analysis to determine what category the restrictions fall into. The dichotomies are not even 
mentioned in the other Pickering cases. See id. 
 129. See NTEU, 513 U.S. at 468, 470. 
 130. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
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In the 1988 general election, the citizens of Arizona added an 
English-only provision to the Arizona Constitution.131 The Arizona 
Attorney General issued an interpretation of the amendment, finding 
that it did “not prohibit the use of a language other than English to 
facilitate the delivery of governmental services,” nor did it “prohibit 
the use of other languages when they are reasonably required in the 
day-to-day operation of government.”132 The Arizona Supreme 
Court, the federal district court, and the Ninth Circuit all rejected 
the Attorney General’s construction because the statute was not 
“readily susceptible” to that interpretation133 but was “in effect a 
‘remarkable job of plastic surgery upon the face of the ordi-
nance.’”134 All three courts interpreted the statute to prohibit “the 
use of any language other than English by all officers and employees 
of all political subdivisions in Arizona while performing their official 
duties” unless one of the “limited exceptions” outlined in the statute 
applied.135 
The Ninth Circuit majority found that the prohibition on use of 
foreign languages was a prohibition on speech.136 The focus of its 
analysis was on the speech rights of public employees, who were 
prohibited from speaking to citizens in languages other than English. 
The court applied the Pickering line of analysis, balancing the inter-
ests of the speaker and of the government, to determine if the 
amendment was a constitutional limitation on employee speech.137 
The majority determined it was unconstitutional.138 Judges Fernan-
dez and Wallace, in separate dissents, argued that the prohibition on 
 
 131. The full text of the amendment is included as Appendix A. 
 132. Ariz. Op. Atty. Gen. No. I89-009, 1989 WL 407503, at *1 (Jan. 24, 1989). The 
Attorney General construed the statute in this way so that it would be “compatible with the 
United States Constitution and federal laws.” Id. 
 133. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 929 (citing Va. v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 
(1988)); Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309, 315 (D. Ariz. 1990) (same); Ruiz, 957 P.2d at 992 
(same). 
 134. Mofford, 730 F. Supp at 316 (quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 
U.S. 147, 153 (1969)); Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 931 (same); Ruiz, 957 P.2d at 992 (same). 
 135. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 928 (quoting Mofford, 730 F. Supp. at 314); Ruiz, 957 P.2d at 
993 (determining that the statute “is plainly written in the broadest possible terms, declaring 
that the ‘English language is the language of . . . all government functions and actions’ and 
prohibiting all ‘government officials and employees’ at every level of state and local govern-
ment from using non-English languages ‘during the performance of government business.’”). 
 136. See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 934–36. 
 137. See id. at 933, 937–47. 
 138. See id. at 947. 
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foreign languages was a prohibition on a mode of expression or con-
duct.139 Judges Kozinski and Fernandez, again in separate dissents, 
argued that the relevant test was not Pickering and progeny but Rust 
and Rosenberger, and thus the amendment was constitutional.140 
The Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s opinion and ordered 
the dismissal of the suit as moot.141 
In 1998, the Arizona Supreme Court found the Arizona English-
only amendment to be an unconstitutional abridgment of free 
speech and also to violate the Equal Protection Clause because it 
burdened fundamental First Amendment rights, specifically the right 
to petition the government for redress of grievances.142 The court 
found that the provision unconstitutionally abridged the free speech 
rights “of the public, of public employees, and of elected officials.”143 
The court also found that the statute was not a valid time, place, and 
manner provision, and could not be characterized as a “content- and 
viewpoint-neutral ban” because “the amendment effectively bar[red] 
communication itself”144 and thus left no available “alternative means 
of communication.”145 Unfortunately, the Arizona Supreme Court 
performed no in-depth analysis of the First Amendment issues. 
III. ABRIDGING THE SPEECH RIGHTS OF GOVERNMENT 
EMPLOYEES: AN ANALYSIS UNDER PICKERING/NTEU 
For the sake of the following analysis, I will assume a construc-
tion of an English-only statute like that given to the Arizona 
amendment, namely, as prohibiting “the use of any language other 
than English” by public employees “while performing their official 
duties.”146 
 
 139. See id. at 958 (Fernandez, J., dissenting); id. at 959–60 (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
 140. See id. at 955–57 (Fernandez, J., dissenting); id. at 960–63 (Kozinski, J., dissent-
ing). 
 141. Arizonans for Official English v. Ariz., 520 U.S. 43 (1997). The Court also stated 
that the Ninth Circuit and the federal district court should have certified the question of the 
appropriate construction of the amendment to the Arizona Supreme Court or, alternatively, 
should have abstained from ruling on the constitutional issue until after the Arizona Supreme 
Court had rendered a construction of the amendment in analogous proceedings pending in 
state court. See id. at 75–80. 
 142. See Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984, 1002 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 999. 
 145. Id. at 998. 
 146. Yniguez, 69 F.3d 920, 928 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (quoting Mofford, 730 F. 
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A. Speech of Public Concern or Private Concern? 
The Pickering/NTEU case law only protects an employee’s in-
terest in speaking and an audience’s interest in receiving speech on 
public concern. Thus the first issue in any Pickering/NTEU analysis 
is whether the speech is of public concern or of private concern. 
The Ninth Circuit in Yniguez struggled over this issue, stating 
that the speech barred by an English-only amendment “does not fit 
easily into any of the categories previously established in the case 
law.”147 The majority recognized that the speech is not like the per-
sonal speech in Connick, which dealt with a complaint by the em-
ployee about internal transfer procedure and morale in a District At-
torney’s office.148 Nor is it speech like that in Pickering or most of 
the other cases, where an employee speaks out by giving his own per-
sonal opinion on a public issue.149 In neither of these Connick or 
Pickering scenarios does the government employee seek to dissemi-
nate a government message (rather than his own opinion) contrary 
to the wishes of his employer. However, the case law, both in the 
Supreme Court and the circuit courts, is plain: in the public em-
ployee context, public concern speech is defined to include any 
speech of public import or interest, while private speech includes 
only issues dealing with interoffice complaints.150 The Ninth Circuit 
majority concluded that because the speech prohibited by the Eng-
lish-only statute was of public import, the speech was, therefore, of 
public concern. While their conclusion was correct, the court failed 
to fully analyze the issue under the test set out in Connick. 
In Connick, the Supreme Court explained that “[w]hether an 
employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern must be de-
termined by the content, form, and context of a given statement.”151 
In NTEU, the Supreme Court added another factor to the mix: the 
interest of the recipients in receiving the information.152 
 
Supp. 309, 314 (D. Ariz. 1990)); see also supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 147. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 939. 
 148. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 149. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 150. See infra notes 153–56 and accompanying text. 
 151. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48. 
 152. See NTEU, 513 U.S. 454, 468–70 (1995). 
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1. Content of the speech 
Because an English-only statute is an ex ante prohibition on 
speech by governmental employees in a foreign language, it is not 
like the Pickering and Connick cases in which the court can examine 
the exact content of the speech that led to the firing of the em-
ployee. But the very nature of an English-only restriction on gov-
ernment employees reveals what the basic content of the vast major-
ity of the restricted speech will be: governmental information and 
discussion surrounding governmental services. 
The Supreme Court has not provided a precise definition for 
what content constitutes speech of public concern, but the Court has 
made clear what speech is of merely private and not public concern. 
For example, in Connick, the Court found that the speech was pri-
vate concern speech “[w]hen employee expression cannot be fairly 
considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other con-
cern to the community.”153 English-only statutes restrict employees 
from providing governmental information and services to non-
English-speaking citizens. Such information and provision of basic 
government services certainly “relat[es] to any matter of political, so-
cial, or other concern to the community” and is thus speech of pub-
lic concern rather than of private concern. As stated by the Yniguez 
majority: speech prohibited by the English-only provision was “un-
questionably of public import. It pertains to the provision of gov-
ernmental services and information. Unless that speech is delivered 
in a form that the intended recipients can comprehend, they are 
likely to be deprived of much needed data as well as of substantial 
public and private benefits.”154 
Additionally, in Connick, the Court found that part of the 
speech was protected because it “[was] a matter of interest to the 
community upon which it is essential that public employees be able 
to speak out freely without fear of retaliatory dismissal.”155 Again, 
government information and services would be “of interest to the 
[non-English-speaking] community.” Thus, under the Supreme 
Court’s definition of public concern speech in Connick, the speech 
restricted by English-only statutes, namely, governmental informa-
 
 153. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. 
 154. Yniguez, 69 F.3d 920, 940 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
 155. Connick, 461 U.S. at 149. 
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tion and services, is public concern speech.156 
The Fernandez dissent in Yniguez carefully avoided the govern-
ment content of Yniguez’s speech. Judge Fernandez argued that the 
issue merely involved “the language used, not the public or private 
concern content of the language. An employee might well speak out 
on a matter of public concern in any language, or might simply en-
gage in private-concern grumbling or disruption in any language.”157 
But the Connick test requires that a court examine the content of 
the message when possible, and the content of the message that 
Yniguez was prohibited from giving non-English speakers was clear: 
governmental information and services. Additionally, in NTEU, 
where the court also could not determine the exact content of the 
speech at issue, Justice O’Connor noted in her concurrence that the 
restriction “doubtless inhibit[ed] some speech on matters of substan-
tial public interest.”158 In the English-only context, the far majority 
of the prohibited speech would be government information and ser-
vices—“speech on matters of substantial public interest.” 
 
 
 156. Based on Connick and other Supreme Court cases, the federal circuit courts have 
articulated their own tests for whether or not speech is of public concern. Under any of these 
tests, the governmental information and services that bilingual employees are restricted from 
giving to non-English-speaking recipients is speech of public concern. According to the Fourth 
and Tenth Circuits, “[s]peech involves a matter of public concern when it involves an issue of 
social, political or other interest to a community.” Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 406 
(4th Cir. 2000) (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 146); see also Horstkoetter v. Dep’t of Pub. 
Safety, 159 F.3d 1265, 1271 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that public concern speech is speech 
“of interest to the community, whether for social, political, or other reasons”) (quoting Lytle 
v. City of Haysville, 138 F.3d 857, 863 (10th Cir. 1998)). In fact, the Second Circuit has 
found that information regarding social services was public concern speech because it was “of 
considerable importance to the public.” Harman v. City of New York, 140 F.3d 111, 118 (2d 
Cir. 1998). The Ninth and D.C. Circuits have “defined public concern speech broadly to in-
clude almost any matter other than speech that relates to internal power struggles within the 
workplace.” Tucker v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., 97 F.3d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 1996). The D.C. 
Circuit has said “the ‘public concern’ criterion” refers “not to the number of interested listen-
ers . . . but to whether the expression relates to some issue of interest beyond the employee’s 
bureaucratic niche.” That is, public versus private concern is defined as the difference “between 
issues of external interest as opposed to ones of internal office management.” Nat’l Treasury 
Employees Union v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271, 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1993), aff’d in relevant 
part, rev’d in part on other grounds, NTEU, 513 U.S. 454 (1995), quoted in Tucker, 97 F.3d 
at 1204; see also Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.8. According to Justice O’Connor’s concurrence 
in NTEU, private concern speech is speech that “relate[s] to ‘internal office affairs’ or the em-
ployee’s status as an employee.” NTEU, 513 U.S. at 480 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 157. Yniguez, 69 F.3d 920, 955–56 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Fernandez, J., dissent-
ing). 
 158. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 482 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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Judge Wallace, in his Yniguez dissent, quoted Connick out of 
context that “not ‘all matters which transpire within a government 
office are of public concern.’”159 But the Court’s statement in Con-
nick referred to an employee complaining about the transferring pro-
cedure in a District Attorney’s office. The Court concluded that 
these trivial events concerning “a personal employment dispute” 
were not automatically of public concern merely because they “tran-
spire[d] within a government office.”160 The Court was not saying, 
however, that information about basic government services was not 
of public concern. Public concern speech has been defined in 
Pickering and Connick as including those matters “vital to informed 
decision-making by the electorate,”161 or “relating to any matter of 
political, social, or other concern to the community.”162 Providing 
governmental services and information to citizens falls within both of 
these Supreme Court definitions. 
2. Form of the speech 
Connick also gave weight to the “form of speech” at issue. In 
context, “form” seems to refer to whether or not the speaker in-
tended to disseminate information to the public. If so, the Court in-
dicated that the speech is more likely to be public concern speech. In 
Connick, the Court found that “Myers did not seek to inform the 
public” about problems in the Attorney General’s office.163 By con-
trast, in NTEU, the court found that the speech “addresse[d] . . . a 
public audience.”164 Employees seeking to disseminate governmental 
 
 159. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 956 (Fernandez, J., dissenting) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 
149). 
 160. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.8, 149. 
 161. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968); see also Rankin v. McPher-
son, 483 U.S. 378, 395 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Pickering). 
 162. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. 
 163. Id. at 148. 
 164. NTEU, 513 U.S. 454, 466 (1995). In NTEU, 513 U.S. at 466, the Court found 
that the speech “addressed to a public audience [i.e., form], [was] made outside the workplace 
[i.e., context], and involved content largely unrelated to government employment [i.e., con-
tent].” Judge Wallace, in his Yniguez dissent, equated these findings with the criteria for pub-
lic-concern speech. He stated, “The most recent Supreme Court case on point found that 
speech is of public concern when it ‘addresse[s] a public audience, [is] made outside the work-
place, and involve[s] content largely unrelated to . . . government employment.’ . . . The pur-
portedly suppressed speech here does not fit this description.” Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 960 (Wal-
lace, J., dissenting) (quoting NTEU, 513 U.S. at 466). In NTEU, the Court makes this 
finding as a summation of its form, context, and content analysis; it is not saying that any of 
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information and services to the public are by definition attempting to 
“inform the [non-English-speaking] public” and “address[] a public 
audience.” Thus, the prohibited speech is made to the public, weigh-
ing in favor of categorizing speech as speech of public concern.165 
Judge Fernandez, in his Yniguez dissent, said that if he were 
“forced” to categorize the speech as either public or private concern, 
“it is more like a case of private concern speech. The simple fact is 
that the State . . . has determined that its work will be done in Eng-
lish, and Yniguez, for her own private reason, does not wish to obey 
that determination.”166 Judge Fernandez failed to properly assess the 
form of the speech. Yniguez was not speaking Spanish to monolin-
gual Spanish or semi-English-proficient speakers for “her own private 
reasons.” Rather, she communicated in a non-English language in 
order to communicate important information to the public about 
their government and about governmental services—information 
that she was hired to disseminate to the public. In all of the 
Pickering cases, including Pickering itself, it could be stated that the 
person spoke out for their “own private reasons,” against the will of 
the government—but that not-so-private reason happens to be the 
 
these specific findings are required for speech to be of public concern. In fact, previous cases 
show that public concern speech is not required to have content “unrelated to government 
employment.” For example, in Pickering, it was precisely because the teacher’s speech was re-
lated to his employment as a teacher that the court felt his speech should be protected: 
“Teachers are, as a class, the members of a community most likely to have informed and defi-
nite opinions as to how funds allotted to the operations of the schools should be spent. Ac-
cordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of 
retaliatory dismissal.” Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572. The court did not find that there was no free 
speech protection because the school budget was “related” to the teacher’s employment. See 
also Connick, 461 U.S. at 149 (the one question found to be public concern speech directly 
asked about conditions of government employment); Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 
439 U.S. 410, 413 (1979) (teacher’s public concern speech about “employment policies and 
practices at [the] school” directly related to her employment); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. 
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 282 (1977) (teacher’s public concern speech was reading contents of “a 
memorandum relating to teacher dress and appearance” to a radio station disc jockey); Perry v. 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (public concern speech for professor to advocate change to 
four-year college). In all of these cases (Pickering, Connick, Givhan, Mt. Healthy, and Perry), 
the speech was directly related to the speaker’s government employment. 
 165. In two cases by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, respectively, the courts have partially 
based their holding that the speech was not of public concern on the fact that the employee 
did not attempt to speak to the public. See Holland v. Rimmer, 25 F.3d 1251, 1256 (4th Cir. 
1994); Terrell v. Univ. of Tex. Sys. Police, 792 F.2d 1360, 1362–63 (5th Cir. 1986). English-
only, by contrast, specifically prohibits dissemination to the general non-English-speaking pub-
lic. 
 166. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 956 (Fernandez, J., dissenting). 
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dissemination to the public of information or an opinion about the 
government, and so the speech is a matter of public concern. 
3. Context of the speech 
The fact that the employee speaks in the workplace as an em-
ployee affects two different points of the analysis:167 (1) when deter-
mining whether the speech should be protected as public concern 
speech, and (2) when determining whether the speech intrudes on 
the government’s interest in efficiency.168 
In Connick, the Court observed: “Also relevant is the manner, 
time, and place in which the questionnaire was distributed.”169 The 
Court then analyzed the relevance of context to the facts of Connick: 
“Here the questionnaire was prepared, and distributed at the office; 
the manner of distribution required not only Myers to leave her 
work but for others to do the same in order that the questionnaire 
be completed.”170 In Connick, the fact that the speech was per-
formed on the job cut against First Amendment protection because 
it “support[ed] Connick’s fears that the functioning of his office was 
endangered,” that is, it contributed to inefficiency in the office.171 
In contrast, speech given in violation of an English-only statute 
constitutes communication of a governmental message to someone 
in a language the citizen understands. Such conduct would not nec-
essarily disrupt the efficiency of the office.172 In fact, it would likely 
add to the efficiency of the government’s office because multilingual 
employees would be able to give the same message to everyone re-
gardless of whether or not the listener was fluent in English. Thus, 
 
 167. However, just because the speech was made as an employee rather than as a citizen 
does not conclusively end the analysis. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 168. Justice Brennan objected to analyzing the context of the speech both in determining 
whether it was of public concern and in determining whether the speech adversely affected the 
government’s interests in effective and efficient employment. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 157–
58 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 169. Id. at 152. 
 170. Id. at 153. 
 171. Id. 
 172. There may be situations in which publishing and conducting business in multiple 
languages would not be efficient. For example, a requirement that the government hire bilin-
gual employees would likely impair efficient and effective employment. But the Arizona 
amendment prohibited employees who happened to be bilingual from even speaking to citi-
zens in foreign languages. In such circumstances, the alternative is either to turn non-English-
speaking citizens away or to speak to them in a language they cannot understand. Neither adds 
to the effective and efficient delivery of governmental services. 
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the majority in Yniguez determined that “the context actually mili-
tates in favor of protecting the speech involved” because it added to 
the efficiency of the office.173 
4. Speech interests of the recipients 
In NTEU, the Supreme Court added a new factor to the analysis 
not previously mentioned in the Pickering line of cases—the interest 
of the recipients in receiving the prohibited speech.174 The Supreme 
Court incorporated this idea from Virginia State Board of Pharmacy 
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., a case concerning 
commercial speech and the right of citizens to receive advertisements 
announcing the prices of prescription drugs.175 This addition to the 
Pickering case law led the Ninth Circuit in Yniguez to conclude that 
the information prohibited by the English-only statute was public 
concern speech because, “mundane though it may be,” the govern-
mental information and services prohibited by the statute are “of far 
more direct significance to the public than was the speech referred to 
in [NTEU].”176 In NTEU, the speech that the Supreme Court 
found the public had a right to receive included employees’ writings 
and speeches that were made to receive honoraria and money outside 
the employees’ regular employment.177 In contrast, English-only re-
strictions infringe on the free speech interests of non-English speak-
ers in participating in, communicating with, and receiving services 
and information from their government. The Ninth Circuit majority 
concluded on this side of the equation: 
Here, the full costs of banning the dissemination of critical infor-
mation to non-English speaking Arizonans cannot readily be calcu-
lated. . . . The range of potential injuries to the public is vast. Much 
of the information about essential governmental services that, but 
for the initiative, would be communicated in a manner that non-
English speaking Arizonans could comprehend may not be suscep-
tible to timely transmission by other means.178 
 
 
 173. Yniguez, 69 F.3d 920, 940 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
 174. NTEU, 513 U.S. 454, 468–70 (1995). 
 175. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 176. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 942. 
 177. See NTEU, 513 U.S. at 457. 
 178. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 947. 
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Judge Brunetti, who concurred in the majority’s opinion in 
Yniguez, was concerned that the majority’s decision might be con-
strued to “create an independently enforceable public right to re-
ceive information in another language.”179 He specifically wrote to 
ensure recognition of the fact that “[c]onsideration of the public’s 
interest in receiving Yniguez’s Spanish language communications is 
only for the purpose of establishing her right to speak, not of estab-
lishing the public’s right to receive.”180 
But Judge Brunetti’s concern—that if the speech rights of the re-
cipients are recognized, then the public may sue the government in 
order to require materials in any language—is misplaced, though 
proponents of English-only provisions like to emphasize this con-
cern.181 Finding that recipients have speech rights does not bring that 
fear to fruition—as demonstrated by Virginia State Board itself. 
The Court in Virginia State Board explained that there was a 
precondition to finding speech rights of recipients: “Freedom of 
speech presupposes a willing speaker.”182 One could no more sue to 
get a document in Cambodian based on a free speech “right to re-
ceive,” than one can sue to have any speech made that is not made. 
If the speakers do not exist or do not desire to speak, a person has no 
right to receive. “But where a speaker exists,” as is the case in the 
English-only context, “the protection afforded is to the communica-
tion, to its source and to its recipients both.”183 Thus, in Virginia 
State Board, “the First Amendment entitles the user of prescription 
drugs to receive information that pharmacists wish to communicate 
to them.”184 In the English-only context, the non-English speaker 
has a right “to receive information” that government employees and 
 
 179. Id. at 951 (Brunetti, J., concurring). 
 180. Id. at 952. 
 181. For example, in a news article in Utah, a proffered justification for the English-only 
statute was avoiding lawsuits by citizens demanding government services in one of the 120 
languages spoken in Utah. See Dennis Romboy, Activists Defend English-Only (Nov. 3, 
2000), available at http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/0,1249,225007232,00.html. 
 182. Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 756. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 754. The court does note that Virginia can still make appropriate time, place, 
and manner restrictions. As shown above, the English-only statutes are not valid time, place, 
and manner restrictions, since they neither allow for ample alternatives to the communication, 
nor are they narrowly tailored to the governmental interests. See supra note 110 and text ac-
companying note 108. Also, Virginia can make restrictions against disseminating false and mis-
leading information—but again an English-only statute alleviates no such danger. See Va. State 
Bd., 425 U.S. at 770–73. 
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elected and appointed officials “wish to communicate to them.”185 
The Virginia State Board Court cites numerous other cases where 
the Supreme Court has recognized this right to receive.186 
The reason the recipient should also be given free speech rights 
in addition to those held by the speaker is because freedom of speech 
is not a freedom of speech in the air. If government could allow 
speech but could somehow restrict the audience from receiving that 
speech, the speech would be useless. True, the speaker would be al-
lowed to speak, but if it is only to himself, the free flow of ideas and 
the purpose of freedom of speech are entirely eviscerated. That is ex-
actly the situation with English-only statutes. The bilingual employee 
is able to speak, but only in a form incomprehensible to a listener 
who has limited or no English proficiency. This infringes on both the 
right of the employee to use a foreign language and thus communi-
cate, and the right of the listener to receive the message from a will-
ing and able speaker. 
The rationales given in Virginia State Board for finding a right to 
receive are even stronger in the English-only context than they were 
on the facts of Virginia State Board. The Court cited “the recipients’ 
great need for the information sought,”187 meaning the price of pre-
scription drugs. Surely, provision of governmental services and in-
formation, as well as being part of the political process—the essence 
of democracy itself—constitute an even greater need to the public 
than do prescription drug prices. The Court in Virginia State Board 
also cited the “strong interest in the free flow of commercial infor-
mation.”188 However strong that interest may be, the free flow of po-
litical and governmental information is arguably stronger and is the 
heart of First Amendment protection. Lastly, the Court stated that 
Virginia could require professional standards of its pharmacists and 
make certain restrictions to inhibit competition, “[b]ut it may not do 
so by keeping the public in ignorance of the entirely lawful terms 
that competing pharmacists are offering.”189 Likewise, a government 
should not be allowed to keep the non-English public in ignorance 
of government information and provision of services that bilingual 
 
 185. Id. at 754. 
 186. See id. at 757 (listing cases that stand for the proposition that there must be a 
speaker for the recipient to have a right to receive). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 764. 
 189. Id. at 770. 
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government employees and officials are offering and are allowed to 
give to the public in general. Interestingly, the Court in Virginia 
State Board found that even though the state can regulate the infor-
mation (because it “‘affects the public health, safety and wel-
fare’”190), the First Amendment protection is “enjoyed by the appel-
lees as recipients of the information, and not solely, if at all, by the 
advertisers themselves who seek to disseminate that information.”191 
The plaintiffs in Virginia State Board were the listeners and not the 
speakers. Thus, even if a court were to find that government em-
ployees could be restricted by an English-only statute, non-English 
recipients who could show that there were ready and willing speakers 
could still invoke their right to receive, as did the plaintiffs in Vir-
ginia State Board. For the First Amendment right “is enjoyed by the 
[non-English speakers] as recipients of the information, and not 
solely, if at all, by the [employees].”192 
B. The Other Half of the Equation: The State’s Interests 
Pickering requires a court to balance the interests of the em-
ployee in speaking on a matter of public concern with the interests of 
the government in efficient and effective employment. Three thresh-
old questions arise in determining the government’s interest: (1) 
What is the government’s burden in proving its interests under 
NTEU?; (2) What are the state’s legitimate concerns in efficiency 
and effectiveness?; and (3) What are the state’s other interests and 
may a court consider them? 
1. Increased burdens for the government 
In NTEU,193 the Court noted that the prior Pickering cases “in-
volve[d] a post hoc analysis of one employee’s speech and its impact 
on that [one] employee’s public responsibilities.”194 The Court real-
ized that a Pickering analysis would have to be analyzed differently 
for a “sweeping statutory impediment to speech”—that is, where the 
 
 190. Va. State Bd.,  425 U.S. at 753 (quoting Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. 
Supp. 821, 824–25 (W.D. Va. 1969)). 
 191. Id. at 756. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See supra text accompanying notes 47–53 (discussing the facts and holding of 
NTEU). 
 194. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 467. 
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government had enacted “a wholesale deterrent to a broad category 
of expression by a massive number of potential speakers.”195 The 
Court recognized that a court “normally accord[s] a stronger pre-
sumption of validity” to a legislative enactment “than to an individ-
ual executive’s disciplinary action.”196 Yet the Court found that in 
the context of ex ante statutory prohibitions on the speech of gov-
ernment employees, “the Government’s burden is greater” than it is 
in a regular Pickering case involving “an isolated disciplinary ac-
tion.”197 The Court explained that the reason for the heightened 
burden was that “unlike an adverse action taken in response to actual 
speech, [an ex ante] ban chills potential speech before it happens.”198 
NTEU heightens the government’s burden in two different 
ways. First, the government must show a stronger interest than it 
was required to show under the straight Pickering analysis. As the 
NTEU Court explained, “[t]he Government must show” that its 
stated interests outweigh “the interests of both potential audiences 
and a vast group of present and future employees in a broad range of 
present and future expression.”199 Second, the government must 
prove that its interests and concerns are real and not merely conjec-
tural. Again, the Court has heightened the burden from Pickering. 
In a regular Pickering case dealing with a post hoc employment deci-
sion in response to employee speech, the Supreme Court has given 
“deference to government predictions of harm used to justify restric-
tion of employee speech.”200 But where the government has created 
an ex ante restriction on speech, the government “must do more 
than simply ‘posit the existence of the disease sought to be 
cured.’ . . . It must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not 
merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these 
harms in a direct and material way.”201 In her concurrence, Justice 
 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 468. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (plurality opinion). 
 201. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 475 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 662, 664 
(1994)); see also id. at 468 (stating that the government must show the prohibited “expres-
sion’s ‘necessary impact on the actual operation’ of the Government,” (quoting Pickering, 391 
U.S. at 571)); id. at 472 (holding that the Government had not met its burden of proof where 
“the Government cites no evidence of misconduct related to [the prohibited speech] in the 
vast rank and file of federal employees below grade GS-16”). 
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O’Connor noted that when the Supreme Court has previously al-
lowed ex ante restrictions on First Amendment rights, specifically 
with the Hatch Act,202 it was “only after canvassing nearly a century 
of concrete experience with the evils of the political spoils system.”203 
She concluded that “[t]he bare assertion of interest in a wide-
ranging prophylactic ban here, without any showing that [the gov-
ernment] considered empirical or anecdotal data pertaining to abuses 
by [public employees], cannot suffice to outweigh the substantial 
burden on the 1.7 million affected employees.”204 
2. The interests in efficiency and effectiveness 
The Pickering test balances the employee’s interest in speaking 
on a matter of public concern with “the interest of the State, as an 
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it per-
forms through its employees.”205 As stated in Rankin v. McPherson, 
“the state interest element of the [Pickering] test focuses on the ef-
fective functioning of the public employer’s enterprise.”206 Thus, the 
government cannot simply name any state interest that the restric-
tion will serve. Rather, the government is restricted to its interest in 
efficient and effective employment. NTEU did not change this re-
quirement, and, in fact, the NTEU Court stated the government’s 
burden was to demonstrate the expression’s “‘necessary impact on 
the actual operation’ of the Government.”207 
For example, in Pickering, the Court found that the School 
Board did not have a legitimate interest in precluding publication of 
a teacher’s letter concerning a school bond where the statements 
“are neither shown nor can be presumed to have in any way either 
impeded the teacher’s proper performance of his daily duties in the 
classroom or to have interfered with the regular operation of the 
 
 202. Section 9(a) of the Hatch Act prohibited federal employees from “tak[ing] an active 
part in political management or in political campaigns” or from using their “official authority 
or influence for the purpose of interfering with or affecting the result of an election.” United 
States Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 550 
(1973). 
 203. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 483 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 204. Id. at 485. 
 205. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
 206. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987). 
 207. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 468 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571); see also supra note 
123 and accompanying text. 
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schools generally.”208 The Court noted that the statements made 
were not directed at any particular person with whom the employee 
regularly worked, that the job itself did not require “personal loyalty 
[to] and confidence” in the employee’s supervisor, and that there 
was no need for confidentiality of the information.209 Thus, the 
Court found that the employer’s interest in efficiency and effective-
ness did not outweigh the employee’s interest in speech. 
In contrast, in Connick, the Court found that the government’s 
interest outweighed the employee’s interest. But in Connick, Myers 
distributed a questionnaire critical of her employer, at the office, to 
other employees. The Court found that the employer did not have 
to allow “disruption of the office and the destruction of working re-
lationships” or the threatening of the employer’s authority to run the 
office.210 
Allowing bilingual employees to communicate in a foreign lan-
guage to monolingual non-English speakers at the office does not 
disrupt the efficiency of the office. Unlike Myers, who distributed 
the questionnaire on work time, a bilingual employee helping a for-
eign-speaking citizen does not infringe on the ability of other em-
ployees to complete their work. A bilingual employee does not 
threaten his employer’s authority by using a foreign language to help 
non-English-speaking citizens. He is not destroying working rela-
tionships with either his employer or his co-employees. Also, as in 
Pickering, it is hard to see how the use of a foreign language by a bi-
lingual employee impedes the employee’s performance of his duties. 
And, as in Pickering, there is no special need for the employer to 
keep the information confidential. In fact, the employee is giving ex-
actly the same message that he gives to every English-speaking citi-
zen and that he is employed to give to every citizen. By allowing the 
employee to communicate with non-English-speaking citizens, the 
employee actually adds to the efficiency of the office and contributes 
to, rather than detracts from, the “government’s interest in the effec-
tive and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public.”211 
That public includes English- and non-English-speaking citizens 
 
 208. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572–73. 
 209. Id. at 570 & n.3. 
 210. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983). 
 211. Id. at 150. I am not arguing that the government has an obligation to hire bilingual 
employees, only that it should allow those who happen to be bilingual to use their second lan-
guage. 
4ROB.DOC 3/5/02  9:16 PM 
1641] Abridging the Freedom of Non-English Speech 
 1683 
alike. 
In fact, the Ninth Circuit found that Arizona had no efficiency 
and effectiveness interests with respect to the English-only statute—
perhaps an distorted finding, considering that the defendants, Ari-
zona and Arizonans for Official English had stipulated to it.212 Even 
without the stipulation, the Yniguez record and “elementary reason” 
supported the conclusion that a governmental office would be more 
efficient, not less, if bilingual employees were allowed to communi-
cate with citizens needing government services in languages other 
than English.213 The court found that a prohibition against such was 
absolutely unreasonable.214 The Ninth Circuit majority qualified the 
finding by stating: 
[W]e emphasize that by ruling that the state cannot unreasonably 
limit the use of non-English languages, we do not imply that the 
state is therefore forced to allow inappropriate or burdensome lan-
guage uses. In short, we do not suggest that a public employee has 
a “right” to speak in another language when to do so would hinder 
job performance.215 
The Ninth Circuit noted, however, that if the English-only pro-
vision’s drafters really had efficiency as their goal, they “would not 
impose a total ban but would provide that languages other than 
English may be used in government business only when they facili-
tate such business and not when they hinder it,” something the Ari-
zona statute “plainly does not” do.216 The Supreme Court used this 
same analysis in NTEU in order to determine the sincerity of the 
 
 212. See Yniguez, 69 F.3d 920, 942 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc); see also infra note 213. 
The Arizona Supreme Court in Ruiz made no findings on the interests of the government in 
the regulation. As noted before, the Arizona Supreme Court conducted all of its First Amend-
ment analysis summarily. Its only analysis of the Pickering/NTEU cases is a statement that the 
amendment “violates the employee’s” rights, citing to NTEU. Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984, 
998 (Ariz. 1998) (citing NTEU, 513 U.S. at 465–66). 
 213. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 942. The parties had stipulated that Yniguez’s “use of Spanish 
in the course of her official duties contributed to the efficient and effective administration of 
State.” Id. But the court also found, “[m]ore generally, the facts of this case, as well as elemen-
tary reason, tell us that government offices are more efficient and effective when state and local 
employees are permitted to communicate in languages other than English with consumers of 
government services who are not proficient in that language.” Id. 
 214. According to NTEU, the government cannot place an unreasonable restriction on 
employee speech. NTEU, 513 U.S. 454, 476 (1995) (“The Government has not persuaded us 
that [the restriction] is a reasonable response to the posited harms.”). 
 215. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 943. 
 216. Id. at 942–43. 
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government in its purported interests in the speech restriction. The 
Court found that if the government were really interested in avoid-
ing the appearance of unethical work where government employees 
were paid extra just by virtue of being governmental employees, then 
the government would have tailored the law to that end by only re-
stricting conduct that had a nexus with government employment.217 
However, the government had failed to so tailor the prohibition, 
and, consequently, the Supreme Court found almost no governmen-
tal interest in NTEU, as did the Ninth Circuit in Yniguez.218 
The Ninth Circuit properly concluded that “the efficiency and 
effectiveness considerations that constitute the fundamental govern-
mental interest” in Pickering cases “are wholly absent.”219 Where half 
of the equation is zero, the balancing test becomes quite easy, and 
the free speech rights of both the employees and their potential au-
diences automatically trump the nonexistent interests of the govern-
ment. Perhaps in another case, a court might find that a state had 
some efficiency or effectiveness interest.220 But no state has yet suc-
cessfully proffered such an interest in support of its English-only 
statute. Even if a valid interest were stated, the state would be re-
quired to show that that interest outweighed “the interests of both 
potential audiences and a vast group of present and future employ-
ees”221 in speaking to the public on matters of public concern. Addi-
tionally, the government would have to be able to support that in-
terest with credible evidence that the prohibited speech interfered 
with the interest. Mere prediction or conjecture would not suffice.222 
3. The government’s other interests 
Under all the Pickering cases, including NTEU, the Court has 
considered only the state’s interests in effective and efficient em-
ployment. In Yniguez, the Ninth Circuit examined the state’s other 
possible interests outside of the employment context. The Ninth 
 
 217. See NTEU, 513 U.S. at 474. 
 218. Id. at 475–76. 
 219. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 942. 
 220. Conducting business or publishing in multiple languages could feasibly interfere 
with the efficiency of an office. However, it is hard to see how a statute like the Arizona 
amendment that prohibits even oral communication with a non-English-speaking citizen could 
promote efficiency. See supra note 172. 
 221. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 468. 
 222. See id. at 472, 475; see also supra notes 200–204 and accompanying text. 
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Circuit likely erred in so doing according to current Supreme Court 
law. 
In Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, which arose in the re-
lated context of government restrictions on public employees’ politi-
cal party affiliation, the Supreme Court debated whether a state’s 
non-employment interests should be given any weight in either party 
affiliation cases or in Pickering cases. The majority stated that the 
government may have interests “in the structure and functioning of 
society,” but that did not make them “employment related,” and so 
they would not be considered.223 The Rutan dissent argued that a 
court should consider interests beyond those in efficient and effective 
employment.224 
Subsequent Supreme Court Pickering cases have not followed 
the Rutan dissent. In Waters, a Pickering case decided four years af-
ter Rutan, the plurality not only limited its analysis to the state’s em-
ployment interests, but also stated that “[t]he key to First Amend-
ment analysis of government employment decisions” was “[t]he 
government’s interest in achieving its goals as effectively and effi-
ciently as possible,”225 as commanded by Pickering itself. Such inter-
ests were the basis for the government’s ability to restrict the speech 
of government employees.226 Similarly, in NTEU, a case decided five 
years after Rutan, the Court only considered the government’s inter-
est in efficient and effective employment, and stated that only those 
interests gave the government the power to restrict employee 
speech.227 
Arizona proffered three primary interests that the English-only 
statute ostensibly was created to advance: (1) “protecting democracy 
by encouraging ‘unity and political stability’”; (2) “encouraging a 
common language”; and (3) “protecting public confidence.”228 The 
Ninth Circuit first noted with each of the three concerns that Ari-
 
 223. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 70 n.4 (1990). 
 224. Id. at 102 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 225. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994) (plurality opinion). 
 226. See id. 
 227. See NTEU, 513 U.S. at 468 (free speech interests must be outweighed by interfer-
ence with the actual operation of government); see also Hoover v. Morales, 164 F.3d 221, 226 
(5th Cir. 1998) (“the only state interest acknowledged by Pickering and its progeny, which 
may outweigh the right of state employees to speak on matters of public concern, is the State’s 
interest, ‘as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through 
its employees.’”). 
 228. Yniguez, 69 F.3d 920, 944 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
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zona had not satisfied its burden under NTEU. Arizona had pro-
duced no evidence to support its claims,229 but rather relied on “as-
sertion and conjecture”—evidence that the Supreme Court found 
entirely inadequate in NTEU.230 
After finding that Arizona had no evidence to back up any of its 
stated interests, the Ninth Circuit went on to reject them as invalid 
even apart from the fact that they were not employment related at 
all. The court found that the first two interests, promoting unity and 
encouraging a common language, were invalid by analogizing to 
Meyer v. Nebraska231 and Farrington v. Tokushige.232 Both Meyer 
and Farrington invalidated restrictions on the teaching and use of 
foreign languages in schools. Quoting first Meyer and then Epperson 
v. Arkansas,233 the Ninth Circuit noted that the supposed govern-
ment justifications offered for the language restrictions in Meyer mir-
rored exactly those now pronounced by proponents of English-only 
statutes: encouraging unity and the learning of English. The Ninth 
Circuit then pointed out that “despite these worthy goals,” the Su-
preme Court had found such governmental interests to be “arbi-
trary” and completely “invalid” to justify a restriction on foreign lan-
guages.234 
Many sociolinguists also doubt whether an English-only provi-
sion would actually promote unity even if that were a permissible 
state goal. According to William Eggington, a sociolinguist at Brig-
ham Young University and expert witness for the plaintiffs in the liti-
 
 229. See id. at 944–45 (finding that there was no evidence and “no basis in the record to 
support the proponents’ assertion that any of the broad societal interests on which they rely are 
served by” the provision). 
 230. Id. at 945; see NTEU, 513 U.S. at 475–76. The Ninth Circuit hit on a potential 
problem with English-only statutes passed by ballot initiative, for the very fact that makes them 
so much easier to pass than a bill in the end may slit the statute’s own throat: the Ninth Circuit 
recognized that the provision was “a ballot initiative and thus was subjected to neither exten-
sive hearings nor considered legislative analysis before passage.” Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 945. I 
find this to be a pleasing paradox. Because legislatures have been reluctant to pass restrictive 
English-only statutes, “U.S. English” has gone out to the states to attempt passage by ballot 
initiative, where there are no hearings, no findings, and no justifications made for the statute’s 
passage. Consequently, when the statute is challenged in court, the state has no evidence to 
back up its asserted interests. And NTEU requires evidence. See supra text accompanying 
notes 193–204. 
 231. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 232. 273 U.S. 284 (1927). 
 233. 393 U.S. 97, 105 (1968) (stating that in Meyer, “[t]he State’s purpose in enacting 
the law was to promote civic cohesiveness by encouraging the learning of English”). 
 234. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 945 (citing Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403). 
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gation challenging the statute in Utah, English-only statutes actually 
beget diversity and hinder assimilation because they (1) “cause divi-
sion and linguistic balkanization,” creating “language enclaves” in 
which immigrants who feel they are outsiders and are cut off from 
the majority of the population fail to assimilate and learn the domi-
nant language; (2) “destabilize family structures, as older family 
members less adept at acquiring a new language must rely on 
younger family members more amenable to language acquisition”; 
(3) “tend to encase language minorities in ‘second class citizen’ 
status in terms of their political and economic engagement and suc-
cess”; and (4) “create an ‘us vs. them’ mentality between English 
speakers—even those from prior waves of immigration—and non-
English speakers.”235 
The Ninth Circuit also was “entirely unmoved” by Arizona’s 
third rationale, that the lack of an English-only statute would “un-
dermine public confidence.”236 The court found instead that the ex-
istence of an English-only statute would “undermine [the] confi-
dence” of non-English-speaking citizens in their government.237 It 
noted further that prevention of hostile feelings does not justify in-
fringement of constitutional rights.238 
In summary, none of the defendants in any of the English-only 
cases thus far239 has been able to support the purported interests of 
the government—even those interests not related to efficient and ef-
fective employment—with any evidence connecting the means em-
 
 235. Affidavit of William G. Eggington, Ph.D., in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction, Anderson v. Utah, No. 000909680 (Utah 3d Dist. Ct.) ¶ 6–7. 
 236. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 947. 
 237. See id. 
 238. Id. The Ninth Circuit then again weighed all of the supposed governmental interests 
against the infringement on free speech and once again found that under any possible version 
or level of scrutiny of the Pickering test, the free speech rights of both the speakers and their 
recipients outweighed the entirely unsubstantiated governmental interests. See id. 
 239. See also Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (M.D. Ala. 1998) [hereinafter 
Sandoval I], aff’d, Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484 (11th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Sandoval 
II], and rev’d sub nom. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) [hereinafter Sandoval 
III]. The Sandoval litigation addressed whether an Alabama English-only policy for driver’s 
license examinations was a violation of Title VI. The State asserted several different interests in 
its no-translation policy, including (1) the cost of the translations, and (2) public safety on the 
highways. See Sandoval I, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1298. In a decision ultimately affirmed by the Elev-
enth Circuit on appeal, the trial court rejected both qualifications as entirely unsupported. See 
id. at 1298–1313. The Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that no private right of action 
existed under Title VI. See Sandoval III, 532 U.S. at 293. 
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ployed and the ends sought. Defendants have attempted to support 
the government’s stated interests only with assertion and conjecture, 
which, under NTEU, are insufficient to outweigh the free speech in-
terests of both employees and recipients.240 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit correctly found that the Arizona English-only 
amendment violated the free speech rights of government employ-
ees. Unfortunately, the majority erred in several points of its analysis. 
Of particular note was the majority’s failure to realize the irrelevancy 
of traditional First Amendment dichotomies, which left open the 
criticisms that the restriction was content based and thus constitu-
tional under Rust, that the restriction was constitutional because it 
was content neutral, or that the restriction was subject to a lower 
level of scrutiny as a “mode of expression.” One of the aspects of the 
Ninth Circuit opinion that has been criticized is the use of the 
Pickering cases to evaluate whether the speech rights of government 
employees were abridged.241 But, as demonstrated, the Yniguez ma-
jority correctly determined that Pickering, rather than Rust, stated 
the appropriate analysis. For Pickering and its progeny state the only 
test that recognizes both the breadth and the limits of the govern-
ment’s power as employer to restrict the free speech rights of its em-
ployees. Pickering and progeny additionally recognize and give ap-
propriate weight to the free speech interests of both the employees 
and potential recipients, thereby more fully protecting the free flow 
of information and the purposes behind the First Amendment. 
As stated in Kovacs v. Cooper, “[t]he right of free speech is 
guaranteed every citizen that he may reach the minds of willing lis-
teners and to do so there must be opportunity to win their atten-
tion.”242 This is the essential flaw of English-only legislation. It de-
nies multilingual governmental employees the right to “reach the 
minds of willing listeners” who do not speak English. It cuts off all 
opportunity for a ready, willing, and able government employee to 
give to non-English speakers information and messages from their 
government. Consequently, English-only statutes infringe on the 
 
 240. See NTEU, 513 U.S. 454, 468, 475 (1995); id. at 483, 485 (O’Connor, J., con-
curring). 
 241. See, e.g., Angstreich, supra note 20; Robertson, supra note 21, at 325–26. 
 242. 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949). 
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rights of both the public employee in giving the message and the 
non-English-speaking citizen in receiving that message. 
Margaret Robertson 
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Appendix A—Arizona’s English-Only Amendment 
 
ARTICLE 28. ENGLISH AS THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE 
 
§ 1. English as the official language; applicability 
Section 1.  
(1) The English language is the official language of the State of  
Arizona. 
(2) As the official language of this State, the English language is the 
language of the ballot, the public schools and all government 
functions and actions. 
(3)(a) This Article applies to: 
(i) the legislative, executive and judicial branches of govern-
ment 
(ii) all political subdivisions, departments, agencies, organiza-
tions, and instrumentalities of this State, including local 
governments and municipalities, 
(iii) all statutes, ordinances, rules, orders, programs and poli-
cies. 
(iv) all government officials and employees during the 
performance of government business. 
(b) As used in this Article, the phrase “This State and all political 
subdivisions of this State” shall include every entity, person, 
action or item described in this Section, as appropriate to the 
circumstances. 
 
§ 2. Requiring this state to preserve, protect and enhance  
English 
Section 2. This State and all political subdivisions of this State shall 
take all reasonable steps to preserve, protect and enhance the role 
of the English language as the official language of the State of 
Arizona. 
 
§ 3. Prohibiting this state from using or requiring the use of lan-
guages other than English; exceptions 
Section 3.  
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2): 
(a) This State and all political subdivisions of this State shall act 
in English and in no other language. 
(b) No entity to which this Article applies shall make or enforce a 
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law, order, decree or policy which requires the use of a lan-
guage other than English. 
(c) No governmental document shall be valid, effective or 
enforceable unless it is in the English language. 
(2) This State and all political subdivisions of this State may act in a 
language other than English under any of the following circum-
stances: 
(a) to assist students who are not proficient in the English lan-
guage, to the extent necessary to comply with federal law, by 
giving educational instruction in a language other than Eng-
lish to provide as rapid as possible a transition to English. 
(b) to comply with other federal laws. 
(c) to teach a student a foreign language as a part of a required 
or voluntary educational curriculum. 
(d) to protect public health or safety. 
(e) to protect the rights of criminal defendants or victims of a 
crime. 
 
§ 4. Enforcement; standing 
Section 4. A person who resides in or does business in this State shall 
have standing to bring suit to enforce this Article in a court of 
record of the State.  The Legislature may enact reasonable limita-
tions on the time and manner of bringing suit under this subsec-
tion. 
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Appendix B—Utah’s English-Only Statute 
 
Utah Code Annotated 63-13-1.5. Official Language 
 
(1) English is declared to be the official language of Utah. 
(2) As the official language of this State, the English language is the 
sole language of the government, except as otherwise provided in 
this section. 
(3) Except as provided in Subsection (4) all official documents, 
transactions, proceedings, meetings, or publications issued, con-
ducted, or regulated by, on behalf of, or representing the state 
and its political subdivisions shall be in English. 
(4) Languages other than English may be used when required: 
(a) by the United States Constitution, the Utah State Constitu-
tion, federal law, or federal regulation; 
(b) by law enforcement or public health and safety needs; 
(c) by public and higher education systems according to rules 
made by the State Board of Education and the State Board of 
Regents to comply with Subsection (5); 
(d) in judicial proceedings, when necessary to insure that justice 
is served; 
(e) to promote and encourage tourism and economic develop-
ment, including the hosting of international events such as 
the Olympics; and 
(f) by libraries to:  
(i) collect and promote foreign language materials; and 
(ii) provide foreign language services and activities. 
(5) The State Board of Education and the State Board of Regents 
shall make rules governing the use of foreign languages in the 
public and higher education systems that promote the following 
principles: 
(a) non-English speaking children and adults should become able 
to read, write, and understand English as quickly as possible; 
(b) foreign language instruction should be encouraged; 
(c) formal and informal programs in English as a Second Lan-
guage should be initiated, continued, and expanded; and 
(d) public schools should establish communication with non-
English speaking parents of children within their systems, us-
ing a means designed to maximize understanding when  
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necessary, while encouraging those parents who do not speak 
English to become more proficient in English. 
(6) Unless exempted by Subsection (4), all state funds appropriated 
or designated for the printing or translation of materials or the 
provision of services or information in a language other than 
English shall be returned to the General Fund. 
(a) Each state agency that has state funds appropriated or desig-
nated for the printing or translation of materials or the provi-
sion of services or information in a language other than Eng-
lish shall: 
(i) notify the Division of Finance that those monies exist and 
the amount of those monies; and 
(ii) return those monies to the Division of Finance. 
(b) The Division of Finance shall account for those monies and 
inform the Legislature of the existence and amount of those 
monies at the beginning of the Legislature’s annual general 
session. 
(c) The Legislature may appropriate any monies received under 
this section to the State School Board for use in English as a 
Second Language programs. 
(7) Nothing in this section affects the ability of government employ-
ees, private businesses, non-profit organizations, or private indi-
viduals to exercise their rights under: 
(a) the First Amendment of the United States Constitution; and 
(b) Utah Constitution, Article 1, Sections 1 and 15. 
(8) If any provision of this section, or the application of any such 
provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the re-
mainder of this act shall be given effect without the invalid provi-
sion or application. 
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Appendix C—Alaska’s English-Only Statute 
 
Article 4. Official Language. 
 
Sec. 44.12.300. Findings and purpose. The people of the State of 
Alaska find that English is the common unifying language of the 
State of Alaska and the United States of America, and declare a 
compelling interest in promoting, preserving and strengthening 
its use. 
 
Sec. 44.12.310. Official language. The English language is the offi-
cial language of the State of Alaska. 
 
Sec. 44.12.320. Scope. The English language is the language to be 
used by all public agencies in all government functions and ac-
tions.  The English language shall be used in the preparation of 
all official public documents and records, including all docu-
ments officially compiled, published or recorded by the govern-
ment. 
 
Sec. 44.12.330. Applicability. AS 44.12.300–44.12.390 apply to the 
legislative and executive branches of the State of Alaska and all 
political subdivisions, including all departments, agencies, divi-
sions and instrumentalities of the State, the University of Alaska, 
all public authorities and corporations, all local governments and 
departments, agencies, divisions, and instrumentalities of local 
governments, and all government officers and employees. 
 
Sec. 44.12.340. Exceptions.  
(a) The government, as defined in AS 44.12.330, may use a lan-
guage other than English when necessary for the following pur-
poses: 
(1) to communicate health and safety information or when an 
emergency requires the use of a language other than English; 
(2) to teach another language to students proficient in English; 
(3) to teach English to students of limited English proficiency; 
(4) to promote international relations, trade, commerce, tourism 
or sporting events; 
(5) to protect the constitutional and legal rights of criminal 
defendants; 
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(6) to serve the needs of the judicial system in civil and criminal 
cases in compliance with court rules and orders; 
(7) to investigate criminal activity and protect the rights of crime 
victims; 
(8) to the extent necessary to comply with federal law, including 
the Native American Languages Act; 
(9) to attend or observe religious ceremonies; 
(10) to use non-English terms of art, names, phrases, or expres-
sions included as part of communications otherwise in Eng-
lish; and 
(11) to communicate orally with constituents by elected public 
officials and their staffs, if the public official or staff member 
is already proficient in a language other than English. 
(b) An individual may provide testimony or make a statement to the 
government in a language other than English, if the individual is 
not an officer or employee of the government, and if the testi-
mony or statement is translated into English and included in the 
records of the government. 
 
Sec. 44.12.350. Public accountability. All costs related to the prepa-
ration, translation, printing, or recording of documents, records, 
brochures, pamphlets, flyers, or other material in languages other 
than English shall be defined as a separate line item in the budget 
of every governmental agency, department, or office. 
 
Sec. 44.12.360. Non-denial of employment or services.  
(a) No governmental entity shall require knowledge of a language 
other than English as a condition of employment unless the re-
quirements of the position fall within one of the exceptions pro-
vided for in AS 44.12.340, and facility in another language is a 
bona fide job qualification required to fulfill a function included 
within one of the exceptions. 
(b) No person may be denied services, assistance, benefits, or facili-
ties, directly or indirectly provided by the government, because 
that person communicates only in English. 
 
Sec. 44.12.370. Private sector excluded. AS 44.12.300–44.12.390 
shall not be construed in any way that infringes upon the rights 
of persons to use languages other than English in activities or 
functions conducted solely in the private sector, and the gov-
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ernment may not restrict the use of language other than English 
in such private activities or functions. 
 
Sec. 44.12.380. Private cause of action authorized. Any person may 
bring suit against any governmental entity to enforce the provi-
sions of AS 44.12.300–44.12.390. 
 
Sec. 44.12.390. Severability. The provisions of AS 44.12.300–
44.12.390 are independent and severable, and if any provision of 
AS 44.12.300–44.12.390, or the applicability of any provision to 
any person or circumstance, shall be held to be invalid by a court 
of competent jurisdiction, the remainder of AS 44.12.300–
44.12.390 shall not be affected and shall be given effect to the 
fullest extent practicable. 
